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SUMMARY
Ride-share systems, which aim to bring together travelers with similar itineraries
and time schedules, may provide significant societal and environmental benefits by
reducing the number of cars used for personal travel and improving the utilization of
available seat capacity. Effective and efficient optimization technology that matches
drivers and riders in real-time is one of the necessary components for a successful
ride-share system.
The research conducted in this dissertation formally defines dynamic or real-
time ride-sharing, identifies optimization problems for finding best sets of ride-share
matches in a number of operational scenarios, develops approaches for solving ride-
share optimization problems, and tests the concepts via a simulation study of work
trips in the Atlanta metropolitan area.
In Chapter 2, we systematically outline the optimization challenges that arise
when developing technology to support ride-sharing and survey the related operations
research models in academic literature.
In Chapter 3, we develop optimization-based approaches for finding ride-share
matches in a standard problem setting, with the goal of minimizing the total system-
wide vehicle miles incurred by system users. To assess the merits of our methods
we present a simulation study based on 2008 travel demand data from metropolitan
Atlanta. The simulation results indicate that the use of sophisticated optimization
methods instead of simple greedy matching rules substantially improves the perfor-
mance of ride-sharing systems. Furthermore, even with relatively low participation
rates, it appears that sustainable populations of dynamic ride-sharing participants
x
may be possible even in relatively sprawling urban areas with many employment
centers.
In Chapter 4, we consider a more sophisticated ride-share setting where partici-
pants may be unlikely to accept ride-share matches if they are not stable. Generically,
a set of matches between riders and drivers is defined as stable if no rider and driver,
currently matched to others, would prefer to be matched together. This notion of
stability is similar to that of the stable marriage problem. We develop notions of
stable ride-share matching in a variety of settings, and develop approaches for finding
stable (or nearly-stable) solutions. Computational results are used to compare sys-
tem performance under various levels of matching stability. A system with unstable
matching assignments is simulated over two months in which participants are likely
to reject the system’s assignment if a private arrangement between individuals could
bring better benefits. The simulation results indicate that the total savings gener-
ated by a ride-sharing system deteriorate with unstable matching assignments and
that enforcing stability constraints in matching models is beneficial.
In Chapter 5, we consider another set of more sophisticated ride-share matching
settings where participants are not assumed to accept each match to which they are
assigned. In such settings, it may be useful to present users with a menu of possible
ride-share matches from which they can choose. We develop models and solution
approaches to jointly present multiple options to participants based on a complete
bipartite graph structure. This research could serve as a building block for future




Finite oil supplies, rising gas prices, traffic congestion, and environmental concerns
have recently increased the interest in services that allow people to use personal au-
tomobiles more wisely. The demand for ride-sharing services, which aim to bring
together travelers with similar itineraries and time schedules, has increased sharply
in recent years [61]. Ride-share providers across the globe are offering online notice
boards for potential carpoolers, whether for daily commutes or for one-time trips to
festivals, concerts, or sports events. Some online services, such as Nuride, provide
incentives like restaurant coupons, gift certificates, or retail sales discounts to partic-
ipants. Ride-sharing has generated much interest, and recent media coverage can be
found in the Wall Street Journal [61], Newsweek [42], Business Week [68], ABC News
[10], The NY Times [69], among many others.
Private car occupancy rates (the number of travelers per vehicle trip) are relatively
low; average car occupancies in Europe range from 1.8 for leisure trips to 1.1 for
commuters [1]. Similar occupancy rates are also found in the US [60]. The large
demand for automobile transportation at peak-hours together with low occupancies
leads to traffic congestion in many urban areas. The annual cost of congestion in the
US in terms of lost hours and wasted fuel was estimated to be $78 billion in 2007 [63].
Private automobile usage is also the dominant transportation mode producing carbon
dioxide emissions [31]. Vehicle emissions give rise to problems both on a local and
global scale. Locally, the health effects of air pollution represent a serious problem
in many of the most densely populated regions worldwide [14, 38]. Globally, carbon
dioxide emissions are associated with climate change and global warming.
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Effective usage of empty car seats by ride-sharing may represent an important
opportunity to increase occupancy rates, and could substantially increase the effi-
ciency of urban transportation systems, potentially reducing traffic congestion, fuel
consumption, and pollution. Moreover, ride-sharing allows users to share car-related
expenses, which can be substantial, especially since the price of oil has doubled over
the past five years [2]. While ride-sharing is not a new idea, recent technological
advances may increase its popularity, as we will explain. Certainly, ride-sharing must
be easy, safe, flexible, efficient and economical before it will be widely adopted.
By dynamic ride-sharing, we refer to a system where an automated process pro-
vided by a ride-share provider matches up drivers and riders on very short notice or
even en-route. Recent startups like Carticipate, EnergeticX, Avego, and Flinc offer
dynamic ride-sharing applications that allow drivers with spare seats to connect to
people wanting to share a ride. They provide applications that run on (location-
aware) Internet-enabled mobile phones. To ease the fear of sharing a ride with a
potential stranger, these services use reputation systems (see e.g., PickupPal) or can
be linked with social network tools like Facebook (see e.g., GoLoco and Zimride).
The ability of a dynamic ride-share provider to successfully establish ride-shares
on short notice depends on the characteristics of the environment in terms of par-
ticipant geographic density, traffic patterns, and the available roadway and transit
infrastructure. Hall and Qureshi [30] analyze the likelihood that a person will be
successful in finding a ride-match, given a pool size of potential ride matches. Us-
ing a probabilistic analysis, they conclude that in theory ride-sharing is viable since a
congested freeway corridor should offer sufficient potential ride-matches. The authors
also observe that there are many obstacles, primarily in terms of communication, so
that the chance of finding a ride match in practice may in fact be small. Fortunately,
technological advances have greatly reduced this communication obstacle.
Although the enabling technology is available, ride-sharing success stories are still
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in short supply. The development of algorithms for optimally matching drivers and
riders in real-time plays an essential role in ride-sharing systems, and the operations
research community has only recently started to address the related optimization
challenges. This thesis will make contributions in modeling and designing algorithms
for a number of relevant optimization problems for identifying ride-share matches for
real-time ride-sharing systems:
In Chapter 2, we systematically outline the optimization challenges that arise
when developing technology to support ride-sharing and survey the related operations
research models in academic literature.
In Chapter 3, we develop optimization-based approaches for finding ride-share
matches in a standard problem setting, with the goal of minimizing the total system-
wide vehicle miles incurred by system users. To assess the merits of our methods
we present a simulation study based on 2008 travel demand data from metropolitan
Atlanta. The simulation results indicate that the use of sophisticated optimization
methods instead of simple greedy matching rules substantially improves the perfor-
mance of ride-sharing systems. Furthermore, even with relatively low participation
rates, it appears that sustainable populations of dynamic ride-sharing participants
may be possible even in relatively sprawling urban areas with many employment
centers.
In Chapter 4, we consider a more sophisticated ride-share setting where partici-
pants may be unlikely to accept ride-share matches if they are not stable. Generically,
a set of matches between riders and drivers is defined as stable if no rider and driver,
currently matched to others, would prefer to be matched together. This notion of
stability is similar to that of the stable marriage problem. We develop notions of
stable ride-share matching in a variety of settings, and develop approaches for finding
stable (or nearly-stable) solutions. Computational results are used to compare sys-
tem performance under various levels of matching stability. A system with unstable
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matching assignments is simulated over two months in which participants are likely
to reject the system’s assignment if a private arrangement between individuals could
bring better benefits. The simulation results indicate that the total savings gener-
ated by a ride-sharing system deteriorate with unstable matching assignments and
that enforcing stability constraints in matching models is beneficial.
In Chapter 5, we consider another set of more sophisticated ride-share matching
settings where participants are not assumed to accept each match to which they are
assigned. In such settings, it may be useful to present users with a menu of possible
ride-share matches from which they can choose. We develop models and solution
approaches to jointly present multiple options to participants based on a complete
bipartite graph structure. This research could serve as a building block for future
work on the dynamic ride-sharing problem.
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CHAPTER II
DYNAMIC RIDE-SHARING SYSTEMS AND
MATCHING OPTIMIZATION
2.1 Introduction
Ride-share systems, which aim to bring together travelers with similar itineraries
and time schedules, may provide significant societal and environmental benefits by
reducing the number of cars used for personal travel and improving the utilization of
available seat capacity. Effective and efficient optimization technology that matches
drivers and riders in real-time is one of the necessary components for a successful
ride-share system. We systematically outline the optimization challenges that arise
when developing technology to support ride-sharing and survey the related operations
research models in academic literature.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we explain
and characterize the dynamic ride-sharing concept and introduce several relevant
planning issues that arise in this context. In Section 2.3, we present a more formal
definition of the basic ride-sharing problem and its variants and survey the available
literature. In Section 2.4 we discuss dynamic ride-sharing problems. In Section 2.5,
we present the multi-modal version of the ride-sharing problem. Finally, in Section
2.6, we summarize our main insights and discuss directions for future research.
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2.2 Problem Characteristics
2.2.1 Features of Dynamic Ride-sharing
Dynamic The ride-share can be established on short-notice, which can range from a
few minutes to a few hours before departure time. The growing use of Internet-
enabled mobile phones allows people to offer and request trips whenever they
want, wherever they are. Thus, communication technology is a key enabler to
dynamic, on-demand ride-sharing.
Independent The drivers which provide the rides are independent private entities.
This is different from most traditional forms of passenger transportation where
a central organization owns vehicles and/or employs drivers.
Cost-sharing The variable trip-related costs are reallocated among the ride-share
participants in a way that makes it beneficial for them to participate from the
perspective of cost reduction. The variable trip cost minimally includes fuel
expense, but may also take into account wear and tear on vehicles, parking
costs or road fees such as tolls.
Non-recurring trips Dynamic ride-sharing focuses on single, non-recurring trips.
This distinguishes it from traditional carpooling or vanpooling, both of which
require a long-term commitment among two or more people to travel together
on recurring trips for a particular purpose, often for traveling to work. Single-
trip ride-sharing is more flexible because it does not require rigid time schedules
or itineraries over time.
Prearranged The trips are prearranged which means that the participants agree to
share a ride in advance, typically while they are not yet at the same location.
This is different from the spontaneous, so-called casual ride-sharing (see e.g.,
[34]) in which riders and drivers establish a ride-share on the spot, similar to
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hitch-hiking or hailing a taxi on the side of the street. In casual ride-sharing,
drivers and riders line up at established locations to share rides to other estab-
lished locations to take advantage of high occupancy vehicle lane time-savings
or toll savings. The main limitation of casual ride-sharing is the inflexibility of
its routes, which does not allow door-to-door transportation.
Automated matching To establish ride-shares in a way that requires minimal effort
from the participants, ride matching should be automated in a dynamic setting.
This means that a system matches up riders and drivers and communicates the
matches to the participants. We do not include in our definition simple (online)
notice boards where riders and drivers can post desired or planned trips and
choose to contact potential ride-share partners themselves.
2.2.2 The Ride-share Process
To facilitate a discussion on the planning issues in dynamic ride-sharing, we briefly
explain the process of Avego, an Ireland-based software company that currently offers
a dynamic ride-share application for Internet-enabled mobile phones. The service that
they offer is quite generic and similar to that of other existing ride-share providers
such as Carticipate, Piggyback, and EnergeticX.
With the Avego Shared Transport software application, users can offer a ride as a
driver or a request for transportation as a rider. To facilitate easy trip specification,
the application lets users store and select pre-defined locations such as home, work,
and the grocery store. With a GPS-enabled phone, users can set their current location
as the origin of their trip, even en-route. If a ride-share match is established, Avego
proposes the arrangement to the participants. If the driver and the rider agree on the
proposed arrangement, the driver picks up the rider at the agreed time and location.
Avego sends the driver the rider’s photo and personal identification number, which
allows him to verify the rider’s identity.
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Avego will guide the driver to an appropriate pickup location and from thereon
to the rider’s destination via the incorporated navigation system. When the driver
is in range for the pickup, the application will notify the rider in real-time. Avego
automatically assesses a trip fee to the rider, of which the company receives a fixed
percentage.
2.2.3 Ride-sharing System Objectives
Ride-sharing allows people to save on travel-related expenses by sharing trip costs.
A ride-share provider, either private or public, helps people to establish ride-shares
on short-notice by automatically matching up drivers and riders. If the system is
private and operated for profit, the value provided by the ride-share provider is to
reduce the total costs of all participants by the largest amount possible; by enabling
this economy, the provider receives as payment a percentage of the savings generated.
Private ride-share providers typically charge a commission per successful ride-share,
either a fixed fee or proportional to the trip cost. As a result, the objective of the
provider is mostly in line with the goals of the participants.
This is also true for a public system with a societal objective, such as the reduction
of pollution and congestion. The objectives of the ride-share provider and ride-share
users are aligned because both the total travel costs of the users and the external
costs to society relate to the total system-wide vehicle-miles. Note that we implicitly
assume here that a rider has a car at his disposal and will use that car to reach
his destination if not matched up for a ride. This seems a reasonable assumption,
especially in many US settings where 9 out of 10 people own a car [49]. Enhancing the
mobility of system users without cars can be thought of as an important additional
societal benefit.
Given these system objectives, most studies on ride-sharing consider one (or a
combination) of the following objectives when determining ride-share matches:
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• Minimize system-wide vehicle-miles (M) The system-wide vehicle-miles repre-
sent the total vehicle-miles driven by all participants traveling to their desti-
nations, either in a ride-share or driving alone. This objective is important
from a societal point of view since it helps to reduce pollution (emissions) and
congestion. This objective is also compatible with minimizing total travel costs,
which is an important consideration for the participating drivers and riders and
directly related to the revenues of the ride-share provider.
• Minimize the system-wide travel time (T) The travel time is the time spent
in the vehicle while actually traveling between origin and destination. From a
societal perspective, this is an important measure since vehicle emissions not
only relate to vehicle-miles but also to vehicle speeds. Obviously, time is also
an important convenience consideration for the participants.
• Maximize the number of participants (P) This objective maximizes the number
of satisfied drivers and riders in the system. This objective may be beneficial
for a private ride-share provider whose revenues are linked to the number of
successful ride-share arrangements. Moreover, the matching success-rate may
also be an important performance indicator for users of a particular ride-share
service, and a high success rate may spur larger participant pools in the future.
2.2.3.1 Constraints on Matches
When determining matches between drivers and riders in a ride-share system, a num-
ber of constraints on the feasibility of matches must be observed. The timing of
rides is probably the most important consideration since time tends to be a more
constraining factor than the availability of spare seats.
Both riders and drivers must provide information on their time schedule prefer-
ences. Many of the currently available and proposed dynamic ride-share applications
simply let each potential participant specify a desired departure time. The provider
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then attempts to find an assignment with a departure time that is as close as pos-
sible to this desired departure time. This approach minimizes the information that
participants must supply, but, at the same time, provides only limited information
regarding a participant’s time preferences and flexibility. Therefore, most studies
capture a participant’s time preferences by a time window representation. For exam-
ple, a participant could specify an earliest possible departure time and latest possible
arrival time (see Figure 1) [4]. Furthermore, limits on the actual time that users may
spend traveling on a given trip could be allowed [7, 8]. That is, each participant is
allowed to specify the maximum excess travel time (over the direct travel time for his
origin to destination) he is willing to accept.
Announcement 
time Latest arrival time
direct travel time + flexibilityLead-time
Earliest 
Departure time
Figure 1: Time Schedule Information in Ride-sharing
In addition to time, there are other important feasibility considerations that deter-
mine whether a particular ride-share match is one that the participants would accept.
For example, female participants may not feel safe sharing a ride alone with a male
stranger [41], while smoking may be another critical issue [28]. The user may only feel
comfortable sharing a ride with certain groups of people, where the group preferences
may be motivated by personal safety or social considerations. For example, one may
not be willing to share a ride with a complete stranger and may only want to share
rides with friends and colleagues. Of course, the more restrictions a potential user
places on his pool of potential ride-share partners, the more difficult it will be to find
successful matches for that user [20].
Lastly, ride-share users may choose to participate primarily to reduce their travel
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costs. Therefore, it is probably also necessary to include constraints that restrict
feasible matches to those that reduce the travel costs of each ride-share participant.
Of course, determining whether or not a user reduces his costs via a ride-share depends
on how costs are shared in such systems, which is the subject of the next section.
2.2.4 Cost Considerations
People may choose to participate in ride-sharing primarily for potential cost-savings;
trip-related expenses, such as fuel and tolls, are shared. Thus, ride-shares should
only be established if they reduce the cost of each individual participant. Although
large cost savings may eventually come from riders giving up automobiles, freeing
themselves from the capital and insurance costs associated with owning or leasing a
car, ride-sharing is unlikely to reduce private car ownership in the near future. In
the short term, individuals will not give up their cars, making the costs of ownership
essentially fixed and thus not pertinent to the travel decisions. Therefore, the litera-
ture on ride-sharing typically focusses on variable travel costs that are proportional
to vehicle-miles.
When travel costs are roughly proportional to distance traveled, cost reduction
is only possible when the length of a ride-share trip is shorter than the sum of the
lengths of the separate trips. Note that a complete ride-share trip should be defined
as all travel required to move each participant from his origin to his destination. For
example, in the case where a driver shares a ride with a single rider this would include
travel from the driver’s origin to the rider’s origin, then onto to the rider’s destination,
and finally onto the driver’s destination.
If the cost of ride-share trip is less than the sum of the costs of individual trips
of its participants, it is always feasible to allocate the cost savings among the par-
ticipants such that each individual receives cost savings. Each driver can reduce his
trip cost by receiving compensation that is greater than the marginal cost required to
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accommodate the rider(s), i.e., the marginal travel cost required by detours necessary
to serve the riders. For the ride-share to be beneficial for a rider, the compensation
he pays to the driver(s) should be lower than the cost of driving themselves with
their own car. There are various ways to divide the trip costs between the ride-share
partners. A natural way to allocate the costs of the joint trip is proportional to the
distances of the separate trips [4]. It is also reasonable to simply split the cost equally
among all participants.
The cost-savings threshold for participation may differ from person to person.
Some people may only participate if their trip cost is reduced by at least x percent,
whereas for others the social and environmental benefits of ride-sharing may be reason
enough to participate (they may even be willing to accept a small increase in their
trip costs). Riders without a car at their disposal may be willing to pay more than the
cost of driving alone since alternative transportation options may be costly and/or
inconvenient. An auction-based mechanism to determine the driver’s compensation
is proposed by Kleiner et al. [35]. This approach takes into account the different ride
valuations of individual riders. For each rider, they simulate an individual willingness
to pay per mile that lies between the cost of driving alone in a private car and the
cost of taking a taxi. In this environment, higher driver compensations correspond
with more ride-share matches because drivers accept longer detours.
Note that local regulations may not allow cost-sharing on a per trip basis (see
e.g., http://save.pickuppal.com/). In such situations, riders may compensate rides
over time by offering rides as a driver. Several papers study the expected fairness
of different algorithms to decide in real-time whether a participant should act as a
driver or a rider (see e.g., [5, 25] and [48]).
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2.2.5 System Versus User Benefits
It is important to recognize that a system-wide optimal solution aimed at minimizing
the external societal costs may not necessarily optimize the cost-savings of all indi-
vidual ride-share participants. Consider a system with two drivers d1 and d2, two
riders r1 and r2, and locations and distances given in Figure 2. Each driver can ac-
commodate a single rider. When minimizing system-wide vehicle-miles, the optimal
solution has value 20 and matches d1 with r1 and d2 with r2; represented by bold
paths in Figure 2. When costs are allocated proportionally, each driver and rider
pays the costs of 5 miles, i.e., 6
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of the joint trip length of 10 miles. However, driver
d1 and rider r2 could reduce their trip costs even more by establishing a ride-share on
their own, since the joint trip length would be 9 miles of which each would pay for 4.5
miles. In this case, driver d2 and rider r1 would be without a ride-share since their
joint trip length would be 17 miles. In the terminology of cooperative game theory,











Figure 2: Riders (grey) and Drivers (white) Traveling from Origin (circle) to Desti-
nation (square)
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2.3 Basic Ride-sharing Problems
In this section, we describe optimization problems for finding matches. We limit
our attention here to what we will denote as static ride-sharing variants, where it is
assumed that all driver and rider requests are known in advance prior to the execution
of a matching process. In Section 2.4, this restriction will be relaxed as we examine
the more relevant problems of dynamic matching.
Drivers offering a ride may want to take a single rider or may be willing to take
multiple riders. Similarly, riders requesting a ride may want to ride with a single driver
or may be willing to ride with multiple drivers and transfer from one to another en
route to their destinations. Thus, we can distinguish four basic ride-sharing system
variants as shown in Table 1.
Optimally matching drivers offering a ride and riders requesting a ride is easy
for the static variant in which a single driver takes along a single rider. In all other
variants, determining the best route sequence for a given match, which may involve
multiple drivers and riders, can be more complicated.
Table 1: Ride-share Variants
Single Rider Multiple Riders
Single Driver Matching of pairs Routing of drivers
of drivers and to pickup and deliver
riders riders
Multiple Drivers Routing of riders Routing of riders
to transfer between and drivers
drivers
To be able to properly discuss the ride-share problems, we start by introducing
some notation.
We are given a set of locations P and travel time tij and travel distance dij between
each pair of locations i, j ∈ P . Furthermore, we are given a set of drivers D and a set
of riders R. Each driver d ∈ D (rider r ∈ R) wants to travel from his origin v(d) ∈ P
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(v(r) ∈ P ) to his destination w(d) ∈ P (w(r) ∈ P ). Each driver d ∈ D (rider r ∈ R)
has an earliest time e(d) (e(r)) at which he can depart from his origin v(d) (v(r)) and
a latest time l(d) (l(r)) at which he can arrive at his destination w(d) (w(r)). Each
driver d has q(d) spare seats available.
2.3.1 Single Rider, Single Driver Arrangements
If a driver would like to share a ride with at most a single rider, then at most one
pickup and delivery take place during his trip. Thus, if driver d and rider r are
matched, then their joint trip length is dv(d),v(r) + dv(r),w(r) + dw(r),w(d). By comparing
the vehicle-miles of the joint trip with the two separate trips, we can easily calculate








Figure 3: Example of Single Rider, Single Driver Rideshare Arrangement
If we want to match drivers and riders in the system in a way that minimizes
the total system-wide vehicle-miles, the driver-rider match optimization problem can
be represented as a maximum-weight bipartite matching problem (also known as the
assignment problem). The bipartite graph consists of two disjoint sets of vertices,
a set representing drivers D and a set representing riders R. An edge between a
driver and a rider exists if the match is feasible, with a weight that represents the
positive savings in distance when traveling together compared to when each of them
drives separately. More formally, a constraint on positive cost savings implies a
necessary condition for the feasibility of a match between driver d and rider r: only
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if dv(d),w(d) + dv(r),w(r) − (dv(d),v(r) + dv(r),w(r) + dw(r),w(d)) > 0. Moreover, matches
must also be time feasible, where both the rider’s and the driver’s travel windows
are respected. The assignment problem has been studied extensively in the literature
with algorithmic approaches abound (see [51] for a review).
Amey [7] studies the ride-share potential at the MIT campus in Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts. Given the home locations and time schedules of the faculty and staff, the
author identifies potential ride-share arrangements in which two commuters share a
trip together. The ride-share match optimization in this case must not only decide on
the assignment of riders to drivers but also assign a role to each of the participants. It
is therefore not possible to model this problem using bipartite matching. The author
formulates the problem as a general network flow problem with side constraints to
ensure that a commuter was not matched up as both a driver and a rider in separate
ride-share arrangements. The study indicates a potential reduction of system vehicle
miles of between 9% and 27%, depending on the maximum acceptable driver detour.
Note that when a single driver travels with at most a single rider and riders do not
transfer, the total system-wide vehicle-miles traveled by participants can be reduced
by no more than 50%. The reason for this is that the length of the joint trip can not
be smaller than the larger of the individual trips of the ride-share partners. Again
when transfers are not allowed and a driver can ride with at most q(d) passengers,
we can save at most 1/q(d) of the system-wide vehicle-miles by ride-sharing.
As an additional note, we should point out that it is likely that the very large
majority of ride-share participants will need to plan round trips. In a dynamic ride-
share system with a sufficient amount of capacity, the rider should be able to arrange
the trips separately shortly before departure. However, some riders may not feel
comfortable going to certain destinations without a guarantee that they will be able
to find a ride back (for example, because the alternatives may be very costly). The
need for round trip planning may necessitate that systems allow riders to place two
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transportation requests at the same time. These two request are directly linked if the
rider’s alternative means of transportation is his own car. In this case, a rider may
only want to commit to a ride-share if both legs are covered. The return trip does
not necessarily have to be conducted by the same driver that provided the departing
trip.
2.3.2 Single Driver, Multiple Rider Arrangements
If drivers have sufficient time flexibility, they may be willing to provide rides to several
riders on a trip, either one after the other or simultaneously for portions of the time.
The pickup and drop-off of multiple riders in a single trip gives rise to more complex
routing decisions.
The carpool problem is a special case of this ride-sharing variant. In the carpool
problem workers, partitioned into riders and drivers, want to go to their common work
location from their homes. The objective is to assign riders to drivers and construct
feasible routes for drivers to minimize the travel costs plus a penalty associated with
unserved riders. Each worker has an earliest time he can leave home and a latest time
he can arrive at work. Furthermore, each driver has a maximum time he is willing to
spend driving from home to work.
Baldacci et al. [8] addresses the to-work variant of the carpool problem sepa-
rately from the return-from-work variant. They propose both an exact and heuristic
method to solve the problem based on two integer programming formulations. They
solve several instances, some based on real-world data, with the number of workers
ranging from 50 to 250. Calvo et al. [15] studies the problem using a model that
allows different network travel times at different times of the day. They develop a
heuristic approach to solve the problem based on construction and local search. In a
computational study using real-life carpool data, the authors investigate the impact
of varying the ratio of drivers to riders and show that the total system-wide travel
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time increases with the ratio between driver and riders.
The carpool problem is a special case of the so-called pickup and delivery problem,
which has been studied extensively in the operations research literature; see e.g., [62].
These problems involve the construction of vehicle routes and schedules to satisfy
transportation requests between origins and destinations. A fleet of vehicles with a
given capacity is available to operate the routes, typically based at one or more depot
locations. It is also usually assumed that the pickup and delivery of each individual
request is made by one vehicle.
The dial-a-ride problem is a special case of the pickup and delivery problem that
focuses on the transportation of passengers [12, 17]. Consequently, passenger conve-
nience considerations become important. Passenger service quality may be measured,
for example, in terms of the ratio of actual drive time and direct drive time, the wait-
ing time, the number of stops while on board, and the difference between actual and
desired delivery times [50]. These criteria may be treated as constraints or may be
incorporated into the objective function.
Dynamic ride-sharing differs from conventional on-demand transportation primar-
ily with regards to the supply of drivers and vehicles. Instead of being employed by
a company, drivers in a ride-sharing system are private independent entities. Like
riders, they arise dynamically over time at various locations in a process that may be
difficult to predict with certainty. Since they are independent, they are not obligated
to accept ride-share arrangements that they do not like. Therefore, driver preferences
need to be accounted for when matching drivers and riders in a ride-sharing system.
Driver preferences may include a maximum deviation from the direct trip duration,
a maximum number of simultaneous riders, and a maximum number of stops.
Another important difference between a dial-a-ride system and a ride-share sys-
tem is that in a dial-a-ride system all vehicles typically operate out of one or more
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depot locations, whereas in a ride-share system each driver may have a unique ori-
gin and destination. This implies that in a ride-share system, routing decisions are
represented and evaluated as deviations from a driver’s direct path from origin to des-
tination. Deviations from a given path are also at the heart of a Mobility Allowance
Shuttle Transport (MAST) service, in which a vehicle has a predefined route but is
allowed to deviate from this route to pick-up and drop-off passengers at preferred
locations within a certain service area [56, 73]. In addition, customers who board the
vehicle at a scheduled stop can request a drop off location that is within half a mile
from the predefined route [73]. The MAST concept aims at combining the flexibility
and convenience of on-demand transportation with the cost-efficiency of fixed route
transit. Los Angeles County operates a MAST during the night hours. Passengers
located within half a mile off the route may call-in for pick-ups at off-route locations.
2.3.3 Single Rider, Multiple Driver Arrangements
If we allow riders to transfer between drivers, a rider may travel with more than one
driver to reach his final destination. Gruebele [29] describes such a multi-hop ride-
share system in detail. Potential transfer points could include public transport stops,
shopping malls, or park-and-ride lots.
Herbawi and Weber [32] considers a version of the multi-hop ride-share problem
in which drivers do not deviate from their routes and time schedules. As such, the
drivers’ ride-share offers form the transportation network over which the rider has
to find a route that minimizes costs, time and number of transfers. The authors
model this problem as a multi-objective shortest path problem on a time-expanded
graph representing the drivers’ offers. The authors present an evolutionary solution
approach to solve the problem and show that this approach is able to provide good
quality solutions in reasonable running times.
The multi-hop ride-sharing problem is more difficult when also considering the
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routing of the drivers. In a dial-a-ride environment, Cortes et al. [19] extends the
standard pickup and delivery problem formulation to facilitate passenger transfers
from one vehicle to another. The formulation allows the specification of one or more
potential transfer points and maximum passenger waiting times at these points. The
authors present an exact solution method and shown its effectiveness on small in-
stances with one transfer point, 2 vehicles and up to 6 requests. Furthermore, they
show that allowing transfers between vehicles can be beneficial in some settings.
An interesting area of research related to multi-hop passenger transportation sys-
tems also concerns system design. Rather than focusing only on effectively routing
passengers through a given network with transfer points, another important focus
could be on where to locate the transfer locations. There is a huge area of research
on this topic in freight transportation and airline passenger networks, where tran-
shipment points are typically called hubs. For a comprehensive review see [6] and
[16].
2.4 Dynamic Ride-sharing Problems
In any practical dynamic ride-share implementation, new riders and drivers continu-
ously enter and leave the system. A driver enters the system by announcing a planned
trip and offering a ride, while a rider enters the system by announcing a planned trip
and requesting a ride. Drivers and riders leave the system when a ride-share ar-
rangement has been planned and accepted, or when their planned trips “expire,” i.e.,
when the latest possible departure time of a planned trip occurs before a successful
arrangement can be found.
To avoid one potential worry for potential participants, it may be better to have
each participant specify a trip expiration time in addition to (and which may be
earlier than) his latest possible departure time. If the announcement time of a trip
for driver d (rider r) is denoted a(d) (a(r)) and the expiration time of the trip by b(d)
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(b(r)), then the window for matching driver d (rider r) is [a(d), b(d)] ([a(r), b(r)]).
Due to these matching windows, a match between driver d and rider r (assuming
they have otherwise compatible trips) can be established only in the time interval
[max{a(d), a(r),min{b(d), b(r)].
2.4.1 Arrival of Riders and Drivers
Since new drivers and riders continuously arrive, not all relevant offers and requests
may be known at the time the ride-share provider executes an algorithm for planning
ride-sharing arrangements. In recent years, several authors have addressed this issue
in dynamic ride-sharing.
In [4], we deal with this planning uncertainty by using a rolling horizon solution
approach. In this approach, the optimization problem to be solved includes all of
the offered rides (drivers) and requested rides (riders) that are known at the time of
execution and that have not yet been matched. We evaluate different re-optimization
frequencies and run the algorithm for finding ride-share arrangements each time a
new request arrives or at fixed time intervals. Moreover, we experiment with differ-
ent commitment strategies, i.e., immediately notify drivers and riders of the matches
identified by the optimization, or wait before notifying so as to find improved matches
at the next execution time. We observe that systems that employ the latest com-
mitment strategy for matches should be optimized more frequently. However, in a
system that immediately commits matches, we observe that there are advantages of
optimizing less frequently since it allows the accumulation of more trip announce-
ments between optimization runs. Moreover, the results indicate that sophisticated
optimization methods outperform simple greedy matching rules in terms of the num-
ber of established rides-share matches and vehicle miles savings.
Several papers consider an agent-based system where autonomous rider and driver
agents locally establish ride-shares. [70] and [71] consider such agent-based rideshare
21
systems with the objective of maximizing the number of served riders that do not have
a car to their disposal. Winter and Nittel [70] considers a setting in which wireless
communication devices are used that only enable short-range communications (e.g.,
Bluetooth or WiFi). They show that limiting the information dissemination between
agents does not significantly impact the solution quality. Xing et al. [71] considers
a highly dynamic ride-share system where drivers and riders are matched en-route.
The participants announce their trips (offers and requests) at their departure time,
i.e., a(d) = e(d)(a(r) = e(r)). They incorporate gender and smoking preferences and
specify a maximum acceptable service response time for the riders. Riders may walk
to a pickup-point to facilitate easy pickup by the driver. Simulation experiments on
a real-life urban map of the Bremen metropolitan area show that the probability of
a successful ride-share arrangement increases with the number of available drivers.
The experiments also suggest that with sufficient drivers, dynamic ride-sharing may
be an attractive alternative to public transportation in terms of travel time.
In a similar setting, Kleiner et al. [35] applies a rolling horizon solution approach
where arrangements are committed as late as possible given the time considerations.
They present an auction-based solution mechanism that takes into account the in-
dividual preferences of the participants for ride-share partners and rides. The sim-
ulation experiments show that the auction-based approach provides close-to-optimal
solutions to the ride-sharing problem.
The dynamics of the arrival of new rider requests and driver offers is not unique to
ride-sharing. Various other passenger transit applications such as taxis share similar
features. For an excellent recent review on dynamic pick-up-and-delivery problems
see [11] and [18]. A transportation request for an urban taxi typically arrives only
a short time before the desired departure [39] and vehicle routes and schedules are
updated each time a new transportation request arrives. The dynamic ride-sharing
environment resembles an urban taxi environment in terms of the arrival process of
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transportation requests, i.e., rides, but also has the added complexity of an arrival
process of transportation resources, i.e., drivers.
Note that it is often passenger convenience rather than physical capacity that
keeps taxis from serving multiple passengers simultaneously. Horn [33] demonstrates
that allowing multiple passenger parties together in a single taxi trip may decrease
system-wide vehicle miles but increase the individual travel times of the passengers.
They present a dispatching software to manage a fleet of demand-responsive taxis
taking into account both passenger service quality considerations and fleet efficiency
considerations. The system assigns new travel requests to vehicles based on mini-
mum cost criteria and then periodically applies improvement procedures. The author
conducts a number of simulation studies based on data from a real-life taxi operator
in Australia. The tests show that the software tool operates effectively in a fairly
dynamic environment and realistic problems sizes.
Dial [21] proposes an autonomous dial-a-ride taxi service that shares many similar-
ities with dynamic ride-sharing. The fully automated system lets passengers reserve
trips by phone or computer on short-notice. For routing and dispatching, the author
suggests the use of a dynamic programming approach [55]. The dynamic algorithm
reoptimizes the not yet executed part of the tentative optimal route each time a new
requests appears. Since the algorithm can only solve very small instances the system
only includes passenger requests that must be served in the near future and run the
algorithm for each vehicle individually.
In the area of freight transportation, full truckload carriers have to manage fleets
of vehicles (e.g. containers, trailers, boxcars) that serve one load at a time, with orders
continuously arriving over time (for a review see [53]). The problem of sequentially
assigning transportation requests to vehicles is typically referred to as the dynamic
assignment problem [64] or the dynamic stacker crane problem [11]. Yang et al. [72]
considers the real-time multi-vehicle truckload pickup and delivery problem. In this
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problem, requests for truck-load moves arrive over time. Each request has a time
window during which a pickup must take place. The authors have modeled the static
problem as an integer linear program. To handle the dynamics, the static problem is
solved repeatedly in a rolling-horizon framework. The authors compare three rolling-
horizon, as well as two reoptimization policies.
2.4.2 Anticipation of Future Requests
After ride-share systems have been in operation for a while, it is likely that some
information about future unknown ride offers and ride requests may become avail-
able. Instead of myopically optimizing for the offered trips and requested trips that
are known, it may of course be possible to incorporate information that partially
describes the stochastic future into a modeling and solution approach in order to
improve system-wide cost savings. Powell [52] provides a formulation of the dynamic
assignment problem in the context of a load matching problem that arises in long-
haul truckload trucking. They assign drivers to loads on a real-time basis. A hybrid
model is presented that handles the detailed assignment of drivers to loads, as well
as handling forecasts of future loads. They compared a myopic model to an approxi-
mation of the stochastic, dynamic problem,and showed that the stochastic, dynamic
model outperformed the myopic model in rolling horizon experiments.
2.4.3 Deviations from Planned Trips
Even if the participants agree on a specific ride-share arrangement, the identified
arrangement may not be executed as planned because of no-shows, last-minute can-
celations or delays. In case there are many such deviations from the agreed plan other,
more robust, solution methods may have to be considered. For example, Powell et
al. [54] studies this issue in a truckload-trucking setting. They conclude that even in
a situation with a relatively small number of deviations from the recommended plan,
simple greedy solutions can outperform optimal solutions.
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Reputation systems, which are commonly used to support online sales transactions
(the online marketplace eBay uses perhaps one of the most widely known reputation
systems), could help to establish trust among participants and encourage reliable
system behavior. A ride-share reputation system could provide drivers and riders
the opportunity to rate each other. In addition, the ride-share provider could rate
participants by monitoring cancelations, no-shows, and late arrivals. Such ratings
could be converted into a reliability score. The reliability and feedback scores could
then be used in the matching optimization to favor matches involving participants
with high scores.
2.5 The Multi-modal Ride-sharing Problem
Instead of providing door-to-door transportation, the ride-share concept could be in-
tegrated with other modes of transportation, such as public transit. Ride-sharing may
provide a very effective means to increase the use of a scheduled public transporta-
tion system if it can be used as a feeder service. In such a setting, a driver would
first take a rider from the rider’s origin to a public transport stop, then he would
use public transit to get close to his destination, and finally he would walk or use
another ride-share driver to travel from the transit stop to his destination. Aktalita,
a project currently in development in Guadalajara, Mexico (www.aktalita.com) aims
at developing such an integrated ride-share system.
To increase public transit usage, on-demand taxis to serve as a feeder for sched-
uled transit haa been proposed [40, 45]. Liaw et al. [45] considers the integration of
paratransit dial-a-ride vehicles with fixed-route buses, in a system where transporta-
tion bookings are made in advance. They show that the combination of on-demand
vehicles and scheduled transit allows for an increase of the number of accommodated
requests while at the same time decreasing the number of required taxis. Lee et al.
[40] considers the integration of dial-a-ride taxis with a metropolitan rapid transit
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line. They study a highly dynamic environment where new transportation requests
continuously arrive and are to be assigned to taxis en-route. They propose a dispatch
strategy and determine an optimal required fleet-size taking into account passen-
ger waiting and travel time, number of satisfied requests, and system costs. Li and
Quadrifoglio [44] studies the service performance of an on-demand taxi feeder system
known as the demand responsive connecter. They demonstrate that the on-demand
system outperforms a scheduled feeder system if customer densities are relatively low.
An effective integration of a ride-share system and a scheduled public transit
system will potentially increase, in a sense, the coverage area of the public transit
system, which has many societal and environmental benefits. However, the transfer
from one mode of transportation to another must be seamless and efficient, and
without long waiting times, before large numbers of people will make use of the
integrated system. Consistent seamless and efficient mode transfers will only be
possible with effective optimization technology.
2.6 Conclusions
New dynamic ride-sharing systems have the potential to provide huge societal and en-
vironmental benefits. The development of algorithms for optimally matching drivers
and riders in real-time is at the heart of the ride-sharing concept. We have formally
defined dynamic ride-sharing, have highlighted many of the interesting optimization
challenges that arise when developing technology to support dynamic ride-sharing and
have reviewed the relevant operations research models in this area. We have seen that
there is a growing interest from the research community to address the optimization
issues in dynamic ride-sharing but that the number of specific contributions to date
is still small. We see room for contributions in all areas of dynamic ride-sharing. In
particular, we see the following broad areas for future research: (1) fast optimization
approaches for real-life instance sizes (2) incentives schemes to build critical mass and
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(3) optimization approaches that allow choice.
Optimization
It may be unlikely that realistic-size instances of the model can be solved fast
enough to be of use in a matching engine of an actual, sustainable ride-share system.
In a major metropolitan area, thousands of riders and drivers travel between thou-
sands of origins and destinations during the same time periods, which leads to very
large optimization problems that may have to be solved very quickly as often as once
every few minutes. Thus there is a clear need for fast solution approaches producing
high-quality results.
Another area of research that should be of interest to the transportation sci-
ence and logistics community is the design of de-centralized ride-share matching
techniques. Centralized ride-share matching may not be practical for many larger
metropolitan areas, or may not be computationally feasible. In such cases, effective
decomposition approaches will be necessary. A simple decomposition based on a ge-
ographic partition is likely to be challenging since driver and rider trips involve both
an origin and a destination location, and these locations may often be separated by
significant distances. The existence of trip requests for which the origin location is in
one subregion and the destination location is in another subregion is therefore quite
likely. It is also not clear whether a static partition of the region suffices or whether
the partition of the region should be adjusted dynamically based on the set of driver
and rider trip requests that need to be matched.
Incentives
The financial benefits of sharing trip-related expenses may motivate people to
participate in ride-sharing. Rising fuel costs, pay-per-mile auto insurance and con-
gestion pricing may further increase the cost of private car use in the future, and
thus strengthen the advantages of ride-sharing. However, without a sufficient num-
ber of drivers and riders, the chance of finding a ride, especially one close to the
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desired departure time, may be very small, and thus the inconvenience may outweigh
the financial benefits. To achieve the required density, i.e., the number of necessary
drivers and riders for a sustainable ride-share system, local governments and busi-
nesses may need to subsidize ride-share initiatives. These subsidies can be used to
reward ride-share participants, either on a per-trip basis or a per-offer basis. Subsidiz-
ing commercial urban taxis to act as drivers may also be advantageous especially in
a start-up phase. Subsidized ride-share systems may provide a relatively inexpensive
way to increase the capacity and efficiency of the transportation system, a potentially
interesting alternative to the capital investments required to build or expand the road
network or expand public transportation.
Choices
A good understanding of participant behavior and participant preferences will be
essential when designing of a dynamic ride-sharing system. If ride-share matches
do not satisfy participant preferences, the match may not be accepted, or the par-
ticipant may not make use of the ride-share system in the future. Unfortunately,
providing comprehensive preferences may be difficult and time-consuming for partic-
ipants, partly because preferences may be interdependent and may change from one
day to the next. For example, a driver’s time flexibility may depend on the day of
the week, the financial benefits, and the specific rider. Moreover, some participants
may be hesitant or unwilling to disclose certain preferences for privacy reasons.
Rather than being notified of a specific single ride-share match, participants may
prefer to choose from a menu of available ride-share options. However, the selection
process must not take too much time. Minimally, then, the ride-share provider should
present only the best options and only the most relevant information regarding these
options, which may include the pickup and drop-off times, the travel time, the finan-
cial benefits, but also person specific information, such as gender, age, professional
profile, and feedback and reliability scores. Providing a menu of ride-share options
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introduces various system synchronization issues. If driver trips (rider trips) appear
as an option for several riders (drivers) simultaneously, there is a chance that pre-
ferred options clash, i.e., the same driver trip or the same rider trip is chosen multiple
times. Designing a selection-based matching process is non-trivial and would likely







In this chapter, we develop optimization-based approaches for finding ride-share
matches in a standard problem setting, with the goal of minimizing the total system-
ride vehicle miles incurred by the system users. To assess the merits of our methods
we present a simulation study based on 2008 travel demand data from metropolitan
Atlanta. The simulation results indicate that the use of sophisticated optimization
methods instead of simple greedy matching rules substantially improve the perfor-
mance of ride-sharing systems. Furthermore, even with relatively low participation
rates, it appears that sustainable populations of dynamic ride-sharing participants
may be possible even in relatively sprawling urban areas with many employment
centers.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We develop optimization approaches specifically tailored to the dynamics of
a practical ride-share environment where new drivers and riders continuously
enter and leave the system. The rolling horizon approach provides high quality
solutions to practical dynamic ride-share problem instances;
• We build a simulation environment based on travel demand model data from the
Atlanta Regional Commission, and use it to test dynamic ride-sharing concepts.
The simulation results suggest that dynamic ride-sharing may represent a useful
option to reduce system-wide vehicle miles, reduce trips and save travel costs,
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even when participation rates are relatively small;
• We demonstrate the value of more sophisticated optimization techniques over
simple greedy matching methods in dynamic ride-sharing systems.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe
the dynamic ride-sharing setting and explain the planning issues that arise in this
context. In Section 3.3, we explain our approach to solve the dynamic ride-share
problem. In Section 3.4 we present a simulation study based on the travel demand
model of the Atlanta Regional Commission. In Section 3.5 we focus on understand-
ing the performance of a ride-sharing system over time. Finally, in Section 3.6, we
summarize our main insights and discuss directions for future research.
3.2 The Dynamic Ride-share Setting
We consider a specific dynamic ride-share system setting that we believe is represen-
tative of many new and proposed systems. In this setting, a ride-share provider for a
particular metropolitan area receives a sequence S of trip announcements over time
from potential participants. Each announced trip specifies whether the participant
intends to be a driver, intends to be a rider, or is flexible to perform either role. A
trip announcement also contains an origin and a destination location, and additional
information that specifies its potential timing. With this information, the provider
automatically establishes ride-shares over time, matching potential drivers and riders.
Suppose for simplicity that each origin and destination location is a member of
a set P of locations, and that the travel time tij and travel distance dij between
each pair of locations i, j ∈ P are known and constant. Let v(s) and w(s) represent
respectively the origin and destination of trip announcement s ∈ S.
We furthermore adopt the following reasonable model of trip timing, assuming
that most trips are made with some flexibility in their schedule [23]. For each an-
nouncement s ∈ S, the participant provides an earliest time e(s) at which he can
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depart from his origin v(s) and a time flexibility f(s) that specifies the difference
between e(s) and the latest time he would like to depart by if he were driving alone
(see Figure 1). For example, if a driver wished to arrive at his destination no later
than l(s), then we have time flexibility f(s) = l(s)− e(s)− tv(s),w(s). In this research,
one condition for the feasibility of a ride-share match is that the participant for an-
nouncement s departs his origin no earlier than e(s) and arrives at his destination
no later than l(s). We choose not to model any additional constraints that limit the
amount of time participants spend traveling in-vehicle.
A participant announces his trip at time a(s) shortly before or at his earliest de-
parture time. The announcement lead-time al(s) ≥ 0 denotes the difference between
the participant’s earliest departure time and his announcement time.
Although a potential driver may typically have several spare seats available (see
e.g., [1]), time considerations will restrict the number of stops he is willing to make
in a single trip. To minimize the inconvenience of the participants, in this research
we limit our attention to systems where at most one pickup and delivery can take
place during the trip and no transfers occur (see 4). This does not imply that a driver
cannot accommodate multiple riders if they are traveling from the same origin to the





Figure 4: A Shared Trip between Driver d (squares) and Rider r (circles)
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People may choose to participate in a ride-sharing to reduce travel costs. In this
research, we focus on systems designed to enable users to share variable trip costs.
When such costs are roughly proportional to distance traveled, cost reduction is only
possible when the length of a ride-share trip is shorter than the sum of the lengths
of the separate trips. If the cost of ride-share trip is less than the sum of the costs
of individual trips of its participants, it is always possible to allocate the cost savings
among the participants such that each individual benefits. We consider a match
feasible only if it provides positive cost savings: a ride-share between driver d and
rider r is feasible only if dv(d),w(d) + dv(r),w(r) − (dv(d),v(r) + dv(r),w(r) + dw(r),w(d)) > 0.
A trip announcement s is said to expire when the latest possible departure time
e(s)+f(s) occurs before a successful ride-share match can be found. Thus, ride-shares
cannot be arranged for potential drivers that are already en-route. Furthermore,
virtually all trips in practice are likely to be round trips. While a potential rider
participant may choose to arrange ride-shares for the trips separately, some may not
feel comfortable traveling to certain destinations without having a confirmed ride
back. The need for round trip planning may necessitate that systems allow riders to
place two trip announcements at the same time, and only agree to participate if both
requests are matched in ride-shares. Of course, the return trip need not be with the
same driver that provides the outbound trip.
Although ride-sharing systems may provide opportunities to increase the mobility
of people that do not have access to public transit or a private vehicle, we focus
on ride-sharing as a means to reduce travel costs, congestion and pollution. We
therefore limit our attention to a setting where both drivers and riders have a car
available which they could use to drive to their destination alone if no ride-share can
be identified.
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Given this setting, we explore ride-share optimization problems in which the ride-
share provider seeks to minimize total system-wide vehicle-miles, the total vehicle-
miles driven by all potential participants traveling to their destinations, either in a
ride-share or driving alone if unmatched. This objective is aligned with societal objec-
tives for reducing emissions and traffic congestion. Furthermore, since this objective
seeks to maximize the total travel distance savings of all participants, it also coincides
with minimizing total travel costs, an important consideration for the participating
drivers and riders. Finally, if the ride-share provider is compensated with a fraction
of the total travel cost savings of all participants, the objective is also consistent with
maximizing the revenues of the provider.
3.3 Solving the Dynamic Ride-share Problem
3.3.1 Rolling Horizon Strategy
Since new driver and rider trip announcements continuously arrive each day, it seems
clear that any dynamic ride-sharing service provider must determine potential matches
at many time points during the day. Each time the provider executes a procedure
for planning matches, there are likely to be future requests that are not yet known.
A common mechanism for handling uncertainty of this type when planning is to use
a deterministic rolling horizon solution approach, in which plans are made using all
known information within a planning horizon, but decisions are not finalized until ne-
cessitated by a deadline. At each execution of the algorithm, the planning horizon is
“rolled” forward to include more known information, and the process continues. Our
proposed approach uses a planning horizon that extends forward from the current
time and captures all currently known requests, regardless of their timing during the
day.
A key decision when implementing a rolling horizon solution approach is how
frequently, and specifically when, to execute the planning algorithm. One possibility
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would be to initiate a matching optimization each time a new request becomes known.
This, however, may lead to synchronization issues when a new announcement arrives
before the end of the previous optimization run. For simplicity, therefore, we consider
strategies that reoptimize at specific, regularly-spaced time points. Even so, in this
study we ignore the time required to execute a planning algorithm, and assume that
it is negligible.
In our solution approach, optimization run q at time t(q) during an operational
day considers all trip announcements s that were announced (at times a(s)) prior to
t(q), excluding expired announcements (where e(s)+f(s) < t(q)) and those that have
been matched within finalized ride-share arrangements. For run q, we set the earliest
departure time e(s) of each remaining announcement s to max(t(q), e(s)).
The optimization procedure then determines a best set of proposed ride-share
matches as its output. Although matches may be found throughout the planning
horizon, only a subset are finalized. We assume that the ride-share provider may
notify participants about a ride-share as late as possible. Thus, a ride-share match is
finalized only if the latest implied departure time of the driver must occur before the
next scheduled optimization run. For a ride-share match with driver d sharing a ride
with rider r, the implied latest departure time l̂(d, r) is given by min(l(r)− tv(r),w(r)−
tv(d),v(r), l(d)− tw(r),w(d) − tv(r),w(r) − tv(d),v(r)).
In the case where we determine round trip matches for riders, note that we also
finalize the return ride-share match for a rider prior to the latest implied departure
time of the driver for his outbound trip. Furthermore, for round-trip announcements
in which the participant is willing to serve as a driver or rider, the role of the partici-
pant is finalized when his outbound ride-share match is finalized, and his role cannot
change between the outbound and return trips; i.e., a rider for an outbound trip
cannot be scheduled in a return trip as a driver, and vice versa, since both cases are
likely infeasible in practice.
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In Section 3.3.2, we discuss the details of the optimization procedures used to
determine matches within this rolling horizon approach.
3.3.2 Solving the Ride-share Matching Optimization Problem
Suppose that the optimization procedure is seeking to find the best ride-share matches
from within the current set of active announcements, SA ⊂ S. We first discuss the
simplest case, where each participant declares whether he intends to be a driver or
rider.
3.3.2.1 Fixed Driver, Rider Roles
There are two disjoint sets of announcements: a set D ⊂ SA representing driver trips,
and a set R ⊂ SA representing rider trips. If the total benefit of a set of ride-share
matches can be expressed as the sum of the benefits of individual matches, we can
represent the ride-share problem using a maximum-weight bipartite matching model
and then solve the problem using any linear programming or network optimization
code. Since we consider a setting where the ride-share provider seeks to maximize
the total distance savings produced for all participants, we can use this model as
follows. We create a node for each announcement in R ∪ D, and an arc connecting
a node i ∈ R on one side of the bipartition with a node j ∈ D on the other side if
it is feasible to propose a ride-share match with driver j and rider i; recall that a
match must be both time feasible, and produce positive travel distance savings. The
weight cij assigned to feasible match arc (i, j) is simply the travel distance savings.
To complete the specification, let xij be a binary decision variable equal to 1 if ride-
share match (i, j) is proposed, and 0 if not. Then, a formulation of the maximum
weight bipartite matching optimization problem to maximize system travel distance
savings uses objective function
∑
i,j cijxij, along with a set of constraints to ensure
that each driver and rider is included in at most one proposed ride-share match:∑
j xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ R and
∑
i xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ D.
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To solve the problem in our computational study, we use the standard commercial
optimization software CPLEX. We transform the bipartite matching into a network
flow maximum cost circulation problem by adding a source node s and a sink node
t, along with an arc from s to rider node i ∈ R with zero cost and unit capacity and
an identical arc from each driver node j ∈ D to t. Connecting to t to s with a zero
cost and no capacity completes the specification.
It is not difficult to extend the bipartite matching model to the case where some
(or all) of the riders wish to schedule round trip matches. To do so, we simply need to
ensure that if a rider is matched on his outbound trip, that he is also matched on his
return trip. Such riders i will be represented with two separate rider nodes i1 and i2,
representing the two trip segments respectively. To ensure that these two segments
are either both matched or neither are matched, we must add a bundle constraint for




k xi2k = 0.
3.3.2.2 Driver, Rider Role Assignment
We now consider the more complex case where some ride-share participants announce
trips in which they are flexible to serve as drivers or riders. Clearly, ride-share match
optimization in this case must not only decide on the assignment of riders to driver
but also assign a role to each of the participants. It is therefore no longer possible to
model this problem using bipartite matching, but we can instead use a general graph
matching model as follows. Consider a directed network with a node for each an-
nouncement in SA. A directed arc (i, j) between announcement i and announcement
j is generated if the potential match is time feasible and has positive cost savings cij
when i serves as a rider and j as a driver, and an arc (j, i) with cost savings cji if
it is feasible for j to ride and i to drive. If both arcs are generated, then we retain
only the one with larger cost savings c. The matching objective function again seeks




a single matching constraint is used to ensure that each announcement is selected to




j xji ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ S.
Note that this constraint considers all outbound arcs (“rider” arcs) and inbound arcs
(“driver” arcs) for announcement i.
The general graph matching problem can be solved with algorithms of polynomial
complexity [22]. Again, however, if we need to solve problems with requests for round-
trip matching, it is necessary to add bundle constraints that then require binary





k xi2k = 0,∀i1, i2 ∈ S, where i1 represents the outbound
trip announcement and i2 the return trip of participant i. Note that since we only
bundle outbound arcs from i1 and i2, this constraint only matters when participant i
is selected as rider. If i is flexible and is used as a driver, he may be matched only on
outbound, only on return, or for both trips. Furthermore, note that these constraints
also ensure consistent role assignments within a round trip of a rider, so that if a
participant is matched as a rider on the outbound he must also be matched as a rider
on the return. This is necessary since a participant who shared a ride to work likely
does not have access to a vehicle for the return trip home.
It is also necessary when considering round-trip matching in this case to include
both arcs (i, j) and (j, i) if they are both feasible, even if one dominates the other
in terms of cost savings. For example, consider a problem in which i and k can be
feasibly matched for the return trip of i, and greater cost savings are generated with
k serving as the rider and i as the driver. If there is another participant j, and the
only feasible matches are given by arcs (i1, j), (i2, k), and (k, i2), an optimal solution
may be to create matches (i1, j) and (i2, k) even if cki2 > ci2k.
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3.3.2.3 Greedy Approach
To gain some understanding of the value of optimization-based approaches in ride-
share matching, we will compare the matching and integer programming methods
described earlier with a greedy algorithm. The greedy matching algorithm that we
propose is a straightforward rule-based approach that a ride-share provider could
use to match riders and drivers without requiring more sophisticated optimization
software.
The greedy algorithm works as follows. First consider the case where all announce-
ments are either rider or driver requests. Given a set SA of active announcements, we
go over all riders in the order of their announcement time. For each rider announce-
ment r we determine the driver announcement d (if any) that represents a feasible
match with the largest possible savings and fix the pair as the assignment for rider
announcement r.
For round trip scheduling, we follow the same procedure but only consider riders
if they have feasible drivers for both trips and store the average positive savings of
the outbound and return matched trip. Finally, for the flexible role case, we use the
same procedure but consider each flexible role announcement twice, once as a rider
and once as a driver.
3.3.3 Benchmarks
To evaluate the performance of our ride-matching solution approaches, we propose two
benchmarks that represent upper bounds on solution quality. For both benchmarks,
we solve a so-called off-line problem that considers simultaneously the complete set S
of announcements received on a particular day. Each off-line problem has advantages
over reality, since announcements are essentially known in advance, and thus optimal
solutions determined using a technique presented in Section 3.3.2 are upper bounds on
the quality of the matches determined sequentially in time using the same technique
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within the rolling horizon approach.
The two benchmarks are determined as follows. For the a posteriori benchmark,
a driver-rider match is only considered feasible in the off-line problem if, in addition
to the time feasibility and positive cost savings described earlier, the announcements
could possibly be considered simultaneously within some set SA in a rolling horizon
approach, i.e., if there is some overlap between the intervals between the announce-
ment times and the implied latest departure times. The static benchmark provides
a weaker bound, and drops this requirement for overlap; this benchmark essentially
emulates a case where all participants announced their trips in advance on the day
prior to traveling.
For instances in which riders and drivers announce fixed roles, each of the off-line
optimization problems can be solved in reasonable computational times using CPLEX.
However, when instances contain large numbers of announcements with flexible roles,
it is difficult to solve the off-line problems to optimality and we therefore determine
only a very good (but not provably optimal) solution using an iterative rounding
procedure. In this procedure, we first solve the linear programming relaxation of the
integer program, then fix certain variables xij to zero, and finally solve this restricted
integer program. Specifically, we fix all outgoing arcs from the node representing





0; this restricts this participant from being assigned as a rider, since the relaxed
solution prefers him as a driver.
3.4 Numerical Experiments
We implemented the ride-share matching solution approaches detailed earlier and a
simulation environment in C++, using CPLEX 11.1 as the linear and binary integer
programming solver running on a quad-core 2.66GHz Xeon E5430 with 32GB RAM.
We now detail the simulation study and its results.
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3.4.1 Simulation Environment
To test the viability of dynamic ride-sharing and to study the merits of optimization
for ride-share matching, we developed a simulation environment that considers work
trips made in the Atlanta metropolitan region, in the U.S. state of Georgia. The
Atlanta area represents a potentially interesting environment for ride-sharing since it
does not have good public transport infrastructure and its freeway traffic congestion
is among the most severe in the U.S. Also, many major U.S. metropolitan areas have
similar urban forms, with low population density and many commercial employment
hubs outside of the downtown core. It also represents a challenging test case due to
its large size and the large number of automobile work trips. Dynamic ride-sharing
concepts that work in Atlanta should also be likely to work in more densely populated
urban environments, and perhaps more effectively.
The simulation environment is based on the 2008 travel demand model for the
metropolitan Atlanta region, developed by the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC).
The ARC is the regional planning and intergovernmental coordination agency for
the 10-county Atlanta area, a sprawling region with a population of approximately
5 million people occupying 6,500 square miles. The travel demand model for the re-
gion is used to generate estimates of the daily home-based work-related vehicle trips
between all 2024 travel analysis zones (TAZs) within the region (see Table 2). For
travel distances and times, we compute airline distances between TAZ population
centroids and assume a constant average vehicle speed of 30 miles per hour. Thus,
we approximate the true travel distances and times in the Atlanta region, and ig-
nore any time-dependency in travel time caused by congestion. We also ignore any
time expending during pick up or drop off of riders. We do not believe that these
simplifications have a major impact on our conclusions.
We generate 5 random streams of trips for use within our simulations as fol-
lows. Each travel analysis zone is considered a possible origin and destination for
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Table 2: Home-based Work Travel Information (ARC, 2008)
daily # round trips 2.96 million
daily vehicle-miles 32 million
avg. trip distance 10.8 mile
low occupancy trips 2.55 million
# o-d pairs 2.9 million
max trips per o-d 881
min trips per o-d 0.01
trips. For each origin-destination pair, we calculate an expected number of daily trip
announcements by multiplying the average number of single-occupancy home-based
work vehicle trips with a fixed percentage of vehicle-trips that we assume might con-
sider participating in dynamic ride-sharing (the participation rate). Then, for each
pair, we determine the number of trip announcements using a Poisson random vari-
able with expected value equal to the computed expected number of trips. Each trip
announcement is equally likely to be a rider announcement or a driver announcement,
when roles are not flexible. Once an outbound trip announcement is generated from
a to b, we assume that a return trip from b to a will occur and generate it also.
Trip timing information is also not available in the travel demand model data set.
Therefore, we construct the time windows for each announcement as follows. For the
outbound trip from home to work, we draw the latest departure time from a normal
distribution with mean 7:30 a.m. and standard deviation 1 hour to model a typical
morning peak [47], and calculate the latest arrival time by adding the direct travel
distance to the latest departure time. Subsequently, we calculate the earliest depar-
ture time by subtracting a fixed time flexibility value from the latest departure time.
Furthermore, the announcement time is calculated by subtracting an announcement
lead time value from the earliest departure time. For the return trip from work to
home, we draw a work day length value from a normal distribution with mean 9 hours
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and standard deviation 0.5 hour. To construct the time window for the return trip,
we add the work day length to the earliest departure time and the latest arrival time
of the initial trip.
In all experiments, unless specifically stated otherwise, we generate 5 different
random trip announcement streams based on a 2% participation rate, a 30 minute
announcement lead-time, and a time-flexibility of 20 minutes. Each stream represents
a sample day. As commonly seen in practice (see for example the system operated by
zebigo.com), we specify the flexibility as an absolute value rather than a value relative
to the duration of the trip; a relative flexibility, e.g., 25% of trip duration, will likely
underestimate the flexibility for short trips and overestimate it for longer trips. We
will also use a standard re-optimization frequency of 10 minutes within the rolling
horizon solution strategy, commencing the first optimization run 10 minutes after the
first announcement arrival each day. Importantly, we assume that if participants are
notified of a feasible ride-share arrangement, they will always accept it. It would not
be too difficult to extend this research to attempt to model the accept/reject behavior
of potential participants, but we have chosen to ignore this idea in this initial study.
3.4.2 Base Case Computational Results
We now provide computational results for a base case in which participants are as-
sumed to announce their intended roles in advance, and in which all announcements
are for round trips. We consider three different participation rate levels: 1%, 2%, and
4%. For each scenario, we assess the value of the optimization-based approaches for
ride-share matching by comparing the quality of the solutions found by the greedy
algorithm (denoted GREEDY) and the bipartite matching with bundle constraints
binary integer programming approach (denoted BIPART). Each rolling horizon solu-
tion is furthermore compared to the two off-line solution quality benchmarks.
We compute the following statistics to compare the different solution approaches,
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where the averages are computed over the 5 separate announcement streams:
1. average success rate (S): matched trip announcements divided by the number
of trip announcements;
2. average total system-wide vehicle miles savings (M): miles saved for all an-
nounced trips versus if all individual trips were executed unmatched; and
3. average individual cost savings per trip (C): costs are assumed to be proportional
to vehicle-miles driven, and cost savings are divided proportionally between
driver and rider based on the lengths of their original trips.
Note that since we consider single-rider, single-driver ride-share matches only,
S/2 corresponds to the percentage reduction in the number of vehicle trips among
the population of announced trips.
Table 3: Base Case Solution Quality Comparison
S (%) M (%) C (%)
—1%—
GREEDY 28.2 10.5 26.2
BIPART 58.3 18.3 25.2
a posteriori 60.3 19.9 26.3
static 62.2 20.8 26.8
—2%—
GREEDY 28.7 11.4 27.4
BIPART 67.0 22.3 27.3
a posteriori 68.7 23.8 28.3
static 70.3 24.6 28.6
—4%—
GREEDY 28.3 12.2 29.0
BIPART 74.5 26.6 29.6
a posteriori 75.8 28.0 30.5
static 77.1 28.8 31.0
Table 3 demonstrates clearly that BIPART significantly outperforms GREEDY in
terms of success rate (28− 36%) and vehicle-miles savings (14− 18%) over all three
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participation rate levels. The greedy algorithm seems reasonable, but it does not
yield good results in practice. Not surprisingly, the greedy approach generates good
individual cost savings. It seems clear, however, that it is much more important to
maximize the number of matches than the quality of the individual matches, and the
integer programming technique does a much better job in this regard. Optimization-
based approaches clearly appear to have much potential value in ride-share matching
application. Both methods are fast and can solve even the very large off-line problems
within a minute of computer time; the largest off-line problem with approximately
29,000 announcements required 78 seconds of computer time for BIPART.
Comparison to the a posteriori bound suggests that the rolling horizon approach
is close to optimal for practical instances. This is not unexpected, since the trips
of drivers and riders that can be feasibly and cost-effectively matched often have
departure times that are close together and thus are likely to be considered in the
same optimization run. The gap between the a posteriori bound and the rolling
horizon approach decreases with the announcement density. A potential reason for
this is that a higher announcement density leads to more feasible and cost-effective
matches, thereby making the cost of committing to a less than optimal match smaller.
The static benchmark demonstrates the further potential improvement possible given
advance information from participants. If trips are announced further in advance of
departure, this may allow the ride-share provider to establish matches that would
otherwise be missed because compatible trips may not have been announced before
the expiration time. For example, a compatible return ride may have not yet been
announced by the latest departure time of the initial trip of the rider. A more rare
example would be a rider who has not announced by the implied latest departure time
of the driver if they were to be matched, i.e., if the travel time between the driver’s
origin and the rider’s origin is greater than the rider’s announcement lead-time.
The results also demonstrate that increasing the participation rate leads to a
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higher success rate, and also improves the average individual savings. That is, not
only does the relative fraction of participants that find a ride-share increase, but
also the individual savings from sharing the trip costs. This result quantifies the
importance of density for ride-sharing, which of course is well known. Note also,
however, that the relative advantage of BIPART increases with the participation rate.
Thus, the optimization-based procedure provides additional advantage over simpler
strategies when it considers more options during a run.
Since travel cost is assumed proportional to the travel distance, the reported
system-wide vehicle-miles savings correspond to cost savings. Assuming an average
per-mile direct cost of $0.54 [3], we see daily cost savings in these scenarios that
range from approximately $27,000 (1% participation) to $152,000 (4% participation).
Even the revenue from a small fraction of these savings may provide an interesting
business opportunity for a private ride-share provider. For a participation rate of 2%,
the average individual savings for the matched participants is approximately $1.90
per trip ($3.80 per round trip) which may provide sufficient incentive for participants
(who may already be motivated by travel time savings in carpool lanes or concerns
about the environment). Note also that the average additional in-vehicle travel time
for the drivers ranges from 5.8 minutes for the 1% participation rate to 5.2 minutes for
the 4% participation rate, which seems to be an acceptably small increase according
to the findings of previous ride-sharing surveys [43].
Next, we consider some additional characteristics of the solutions by examining
the individual origin-destination distances of each driver-rider match. In Figure 5,
we see that the rider’s trip distance is typically smaller than the driver’s original trip
distance in a match; 78% of the matches lie below the diagonal where the driver’s trip
and rider’s trip have the same length. This is not unexpected, since if the rider’s trip is
larger than the driver’s trip, the additional driving distance required to accommodate























Figure 5: Original Trip Distances for Matched Participants
rider r and driver d only produces cost savings if dv(d),v(r) + dw(r),w(d) < dv(d),w(d).
There is no possibility for cost savings if the length dv(r),w(r) of the rider’s trip is more
than twice the distance dv(d),w(d) of the driver’s, which further implies that the total
driving required of a driver in a ride-share match cannot exceed twice dv(d),w(d).
Matches in which the rider has the longer trip distance (above the diagonal in
Figure 5) generally involve participants with smaller individual trip distances. The
driver’s time flexibility makes matches between participants with longer trips less
likely. Moreover, we see relatively few matches where the rider trips are significantly
shorter than the matched driver trips. To understand this, note that maximizing
vehicle-mile savings coincides with maximizing the travel distance when both partic-
ipants are traveling together. Thus, more savings are possible if a driver can travel
with a rider who is traveling further.
Figure 6 depicts the success rate of for announced trips of different lengths, where
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Figure 6: Success Rates for Riders (gray) and Drivers (black) by Original Trip Dis-
tance
each bucket represents roughly 25% of the daily announcements. For the driver trips,
we see that the likelihood of a match increases with the length of the trip, again
since longer trips correspond to more potential savings and also result in a higher
likelihood of finding a compatible rider on the way. For the rider trips, we observe a
trade-off between feasibility and savings with respect to trip length. Although shorter
trips may easily find compatible drivers, they also represent smaller potential savings.
Longer trips, on the other hand, may represent more savings but are also harder to
match.
Next we focus on the likelihood of getting matched for announcements with dif-
ferent earliest departure times. Figure 7 shows that the highest success rates occur
during the morning rush period (6 a.m. to 9 a.m.) and the evening rush period (3
p.m. to 6 p.m.). This is intuitive because these times have the highest announcement
densities in our scenarios. A nice feature of dynamic ride-sharing, then, is that the
high concentration of trips that leads to negative system impacts like congestion also
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Figure 7: Success Rate by Time of Day
leads to positive impacts on the performance of ride-sharing systems.
Finally, we consider the rolling horizon strategies in more detail by examining
the impact on solution quality by changing the re-optimization timing and the com-
mitment strategy. The strategy that re-optimizes after each minute coincides with
a strategy that runs an optimization each time a new announcement is made. Re-
call that our base case assumption is that the potential ride-share matches found via
optimization are not finalized until as late as possible. Here, we also examine an
alternative strategy where all proposed matches are finalized immediately after the
optimization run in which they were identified.
Table 4 presents the results for the 2% participation rate announcement streams.
The results demonstrate that for our test scenario assumptions regarding announce-
ment lead time and time flexibility, systems that employ the latest commitment strat-
egy for matches should be optimized more frequently. However, if we commit matches
immediately, we observe that there are advantages of optimizing less frequently since
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Table 4: Rolling Horizon Strategy Comparison
S (%) M (%) C (%)
Latest commitment
BIPART 1 min 68.5 22.9 21.9
BIPART 5 min 67.3 22.5 27.3
*BIPART 10 min 67.0 22.3 27.3
BIPART 30 min 65.5 21.2 26.6
Immediate commitment
BIPART 1 min 62.6 14.3 15.7
BIPART 5 min 62.4 15.6 21.2
BIPART 10 min 63.0 16.9 22.5
BIPART 30 min 64.3 19.8 25.4
* base case
it allows the accumulation of more trip announcements between optimization runs.
Although not depicted in these results, it should be clear that this benefit of optimiz-
ing less frequently will eventually reverse itself. When the time between optimization
runs grows too large, missed matching opportunities become more and more preva-
lent. For a simple example, consider a rider who announces a trip at 8:01 and a
driver who expires at 8:07 (but announced before 8:01). This driver-rider match may
be missed when the time between re-optimization runs is greater than 6 minutes, e.g.,
if optimizing at 8:00 and 8:10.
3.4.3 The Advantages of Flexible Roles
The previous results assume that all participants announce trips with fixed roles,
as drivers or riders. Here, we focus on the other extreme where every participant
is flexible to serve as a driver or a rider for his announced trip. In this case, the
optimization problem considered during each optimization run cannot necessarily
be solved to optimality quickly. Therefore, we configure the optimization with two
stopping criteria: a maximum solution time limit of 200 seconds, or a feasible solution
found that has an objective function value guaranteed to be no worse than 1% smaller
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than the optimal value (also known as 1% optimality gap in integer programming).
Note then that it is possible that no feasible solution is found within the time limit;
in this case, we use as the solution the proposed matches found in the previous
optimization run. This time limit is not imposed when computing the a posteriori
benchmarks, but since the problems are very difficult to solve we apply the iterative
rounding procedure described earlier to find a very good feasible solution; the final
integer program after variable fixing is solved to a 5% optimality gap. Since the a
posteriori benchmark problem is not solved to provable optimality in this case, we
also record the solution of its linear programming relaxation to provide an upper
bound on potential cost savings.
Table 5: Ride-sharing with Flexible Roles
S (%) M (%) C (%)
GREEDY 45.8 19.3 28.3
IP 85.4 31.4 30.0
a posteriori 85.6 33.6 32.1
LP-relaxation 87.0 34.3
Table 5 summarizes results for the 2% participation rate announcement streams
and shows that role flexibility yields substantial improvements: an absolute increase
of approximately 15% on the success rate, and 10% on vehicle-miles savings. As in the
earlier fixed role case, the optimization-based approach (denoted IP) performs much
better than the greedy heuristic. However, the individual optimization problems are
much harder and more time-consuming to solve. In our study, the integer program-
ming software finds at least one integer feasible solution for each of the optimization
runs for each of the 5 announcement streams within the 200 second time limit. In
15% of the runs, the time limit expires before the 1% optimality gap is attained; for
these runs, the maximum gap observed was 2.9%. Note that again the rolling horizon
aggregate solution has total quality not much smaller than the best integer solution
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found for the a posteriori benchmark problem. Furthermore, the best integer solu-
tions found for the a posteriori problems are quite close to the linear programming
upper bound, indicating that the benchmarks are quite good and that the iterative











Figure 8: Matching Results for Flexible Roles Scenarios by Original Trip Length:
Matched as Rider (gray), Matched as Driver (black), Not Matched (white)
Figure 8 demonstrates how flexible role problems solved using the optimization-
based approach are able to find matches for most trips with longer distances. The
figure breaks out trip announcements in distance buckets into three subsets: matched
as rider, matched as driver, and not matched. We see that the longest trips have
the highest success rate and the shorter trips have the smallest success rate. This
is intuitive since ride-share matches between longer trips lead to greater vehicle-mile
savings. As expected, a relatively larger number of the longer trip announcements are
matched up as drivers. However, not all long (short) trips are drivers (riders) because
in fact the ride-share matches that produce the largest savings involve participants
with very similar trip lengths, often traveling from the same origin region to same
destination region.
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3.4.4 Single Trip Ride-sharing
In the experiments described earlier, we assume that all trip announcements are for
round trips, and that both the outbound and return trip timing are known with
certainty when announced. However, for certain round trips, it may be difficult for
participants to specify the time of their return trip, and they may prefer to announce
both trips separately on short notice.
To understand the system impacts that result when participants attempt to ar-
range their trips separately, we conduct an experiment where we consider the same
5 announcement streams for the 2% participation rate, only now return trips are an-
nounced 30 minutes before their earliest departure time instead of together with the
outbound trips. Drivers are assumed to always announce two trips, but riders will
not announce a return trip if they did not share a ride on their outbound trip. To
prevent unmatched trip requests, we also consider using a different objective function
for the optimization problems solved here, maximizing the total number of system
matches instead of total system travel distance savings.
For this experiment, we compute the success rate (S) by considering the percent-
age of riders that were matched for rides on both their outbound and return trip.
Moreover, we compute the percentage of riders (S−) that were matched outbound,
but failed to be matched on their return trip. The results are presented in Table 6.
Notably, for both the round-trip announcement cases (BIPART-JOINT) and the sep-
arate announcement cases (BIPART-SEP), the objective of maximizing the number
of matches rather than savings can increase the matching success rate by 4−8% with
only small degradation of the total vehicle-miles savings (< 1%) and per-match cost
savings (3− 4%).
Separate trip announcements without a return guarantee increase the vehicle-
miles savings for both cases and success rate when maximizing matches. However,
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Table 6: Maximize Savings versus Maximizing Matches
S (%) S−(%) M (%) C (%)
maximize savings
*BIPART-JOINT 67.0 - 22.3 27.3
BIPART-SEP 65.2 10.0 24.5 29.0
maximize matches
BIPART-JOINT 71.1 - 21.7 25.0
BIPART-SEP 73.0 5.3 23.6 25.4
* base case
the additional flexibility creates a risk for each rider of failing to find a return ride-
share match. Not surprisingly, maximizing the number of matches seems to mitigate
this risk, i.e., 5.3% of the riders without a return ride compared to 10% when savings
are maximized. Furthermore, it is also possible to build optimization approaches
that attempt to maximize total cost savings while prioritizing matching riders that
are completing round trips; of course, the risk of not finding a match for a “stranded”
rider still remains. Whether such risk is acceptable depends on the situation, in
particular on the availability of inexpensive alternatives such as public transport.
To allow guaranteed return trips without the corresponding round trip restrictions,
the ride-share provider may utilize back-up drivers, e.g., by cooperating with urban
commercial taxis.
3.4.5 Fixing Ride-share Pairs on Round Trips
Traditional carpooling typically involves a long-term commitment among at least
two people to share rides to work on some or all of their weekly workdays. The
lack of travel flexibility afforded by carpooling is often quoted as one of the major
reasons people are hesitant to participate in carpooling [65]. Furthermore, irregular
working hours also hinder traditional carpooling, since it may be more difficult to
find compatible time schedules [26].
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Dynamic ride-sharing is more flexible because daily trips can be arranged sepa-
rately without requiring the same driver-rider pairs on different trips or on different
days. To attempt to quantify some of the flexibility benefit of dynamic ride-sharing
versus traditional carpooling, we consider a slightly less flexible ride-share scenario
that requires a rider to be matched with the same driver on both his outbound and
return trip on a specific day. Note that this scenario is more flexible than traditional
carpooling, because it still allows different matches across days. We also choose to
conduct this study using the assumptions of the static benchmark problem, where all
trip announcements are known prior to the beginning of the day, and assume that
announcements have fixed roles.
For this experiment, we will also vary the variability of participant departure times
to understand its impact on the value of the flexibility of dynamic ride-sharing. To
do so, we consider a set of scenarios in which we increase the standard deviation of
morning departure time and the standard deviation of the workday duration both
by 50%, and another set of scenarios where both deviations where we decrease these
deviations by 50%.
Note that when we only consider ride-share matches in which the driver for each
matched rider is the same on the outbound and return trips, we introduce symmetry to
the optimization problem since the vehicle-mile savings on the outbound trip are equal
to the savings on the inbound trip. This optimization problem can be represented
using a maximum weight bipartite matching model with one node for each round-trip
announcement, and an arc from a rider announcement i to a driver announcement j
if both the outbound and return trip matches are feasible, with weight cij equal to
twice the cost savings generated by the outbound match.
Table 7 summarizes the results of this experiment, where the lines labeled “fixed
pairs” assume that riders are matched both on outbound and return trip with the same
driver, while the lines labeled “flexible pairs” relax this assumption (as in the earlier
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Table 7: Fixed Ride-share Pairs
S (%) M (%) C (%)
fixed pairs 57.6 18.4 25.4
flexible pairs 68.7 23.8 27.3
time variability +50%
fixed pairs 47.4 14.0 23.0
flexible pairs 65.7 22.1 27.2
time variability -50%
fixed pairs 71.6 25.4 29.3
flexible pairs 77.1 28.6 30.9
results). Flexible pairings substantially increase the solution quality: the success rate
is increased by about 10% in absolute terms, and the cost savings by about 4-5%. As
expected, the benefit of flexible pairs increases with the variability of the departure
times of the participants. This is because one can always keep the same ride-share
pairs on both trips if the participants spend roughly the same amount of time at
work between the two trips. In the absence of any time variability, of course, the
flexible and fixed pairs case would yield the same solution. Since many information
economy workers no longer have rigid work schedules, the flexibility benefits provided
by dynamic ride-sharing over traditional carpooling are quite important to consider.
3.4.6 Varying the Participants’ Flexibility
Ride-sharing asks for time sacrifices, especially from the drivers. In addition, partici-
pants may have to be somewhat flexible in their departure times to find a ride-share
match. The individual benefits in terms of travel cost savings provided by ride-sharing
should counterbalance these inconveniences. Therefore, financial gains less than a
specified threshold may not be acceptable for participants. Moreover, more certainty
regarding the potential savings may motivate participants to be more flexible in their
departure times. In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of the participant’s time
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flexibility and a cost savings threshold on the performance of the system. The cost
savings threshold (denoted τ) represents the minimum acceptable cost savings per
feasible ride-share match.
The results are shown in Table 8 for the base case strategy and a 2% participation
rate. As expected, there are system and individual benefits created by additional time
flexibility. Furthermore, the marginal benefits decrease time flexibility increases. We
observe that an increase in the cost savings threshold has a stronger negative impact
on the success rate than on the system-wide vehicle miles savings. Surprisingly, in
one scenario with a time flexibility of 10 minutes, setting a small threshold ($1)
even leads to an increase in vehicle miles savings. In this case, the system appears
less likely to commit to a match with very small cost savings while better matching
opportunities are available at a later point in time. Overall, the results suggest that
more time flexibility allows participants to set a higher cost savings threshold with
limited impact on the performance of the system when measured by savings in vehicle
miles.
Table 8: Participants’ Time Flexibility and Cost Savings Threshold
S (%) M (%) C (%)
τ = $0
10 min 47.9 13.4 23.9
20 min 67.0 22.3 27.3
30 min 73.7 26.3 28.9
τ = $1
10 min 39.8 13.5 22.0
20 min 56.7 22.0 24.1
30 min 62.8 25.9 25.3
τ = $2
10 min 30.3 12.5 24.2
20 min 45.9 20.8 25.7
30 min 51.6 24.6 26.6
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3.5 How to Achieve Critical Mass?
The experiments presented in this proposal have shown the importance of sufficient
numbers of announcing participants to enable dynamic ride-share matches to be es-
tablished on short notice in practice. In the startup phase of a dynamic ride-share
system, it may be difficult to attract enough participants to generate good matches,
and this will likely lead many potential participants to give up on the system. In this
section, we attempt to develop a reasonable model for an adoption pattern of dynamic
ride-sharing over time, and to determine whether dynamic ride-sharing systems may
be successfully initiated and sustained.
To model the adoption of dynamic ride-sharing, we draw upon the very large body
of marketing literature on the diffusion of new products and technology. The most
widely accepted diffusion model is the Bass diffusion model [46]. The model assumes
that the probability that an initial purchase will be made is a linear function of the
number of previous buyers [9]. Due to interpersonal communications (e.g., word-of-
mouth), potential adopters are more likely to become aware of a certain product or
service if the number of users increases. The probability k(t)
1−K(t) of adoption, i.e., starts
placing announcements at time t is p+ q
m
Y (t), with k(t) representing the individual
probability of adoption at time t and K(t) its cumulative form and Y (t) the total
number of adopters up to time t. The constant parameters m, p, and q represent
the total number of potential adopters, a coefficient of innovation and a coefficient of
imitation respectively. While the coefficient of innovation represents the exogenous
likelihood that a new participant joins the system, the coefficient of imitation relates
to the increase in this likelihood with the number of participants that are already in
the system.
While the diffusion model allows us to forecast how many new participants join
the system, we also want to consider the announcement behavior of the existing
participants over time. Conceptually, we may assume that participants are satisfied
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if they are matched in ride-shares, and thus continue to announce trips regularly.
Participants that do not receive ride-share matches may become discouraged and
stop announcing new trips. To model this behavior, we assume that a participant
i receives one additional positive goodwill credit si from each successful ride-share
match, and one negative credit fi each time a trip is announced and is not matched.
As long as his net credit is positive (si − fi + g > 0), we assume that the participant
will continue to announce his ride-share trips, where we define g to be the starting
goodwill credit of the participant. Once goodwill is depleted to zero, the participant
never announces again. We recognize that this set of assumptions creates a system
that, if simulated over very long time horizons, will eventually include no possible
participants. However, we believe that the model is useful for examining system
behavior over relatively short time periods. To examine longer time periods, it would
not be difficult to extend the model to allow new potential adopters to enter the
system over time, for example, representing new members of the labor force entering
the pool of commuters.
In the following experiments, we follow the behavior of a hypothetical system
for Atlanta over a two month period after startup for different diffusion parameters.
Each day in the study period includes a set of round-trip announcements with fixed
roles, and is solved using the rolling horizon optimization approach. Unless stated
otherwise, we assume the total number of potential trip announcements (m) to be 4%
of the total number of home-based trips and a goodwill g of 5. First, we determine a
set of potential participant round-trips using the methods described earlier. For each
potential participant, we draw a base latest departure time from a normal distribution
with a mean of 7:30 a.m. and a standard deviation of 1 hour (see Section 3.4). For
each subsequent day, we draw the latest departure of each active participant again
using a normal distribution with his base departure time as the mean and 15 minutes
as the standard deviation.
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Figure 9: Ride-sharing System Sustainability for Various Diffusion Patterns
The results of these experiments are summarized in Figure 9, where the fraction
of active participant announcements is plotted over time. The plots demonstrate that
when the sum of the innovation and imitation rates is sufficiently high (i.e., > 0.5),
the system seems to converge to a steady active announcement stream in two to
three weeks. Approximately 55% of the total potential trip announcements remain
active, and the success rate converges to approximately 85% of announced trips. The
results show that even when the total potential pool of participants is limited to a
small fraction (4%) of the total home-based work round-trips, dynamic ride-sharing
may still be sustainable. Participants in corridors amenable to ride-sharing will likely
continue to announce given the high match rate; in this way, the ride-sharing system
































Figure 10: Sustainability of Ride-sharing Systems for Different Levels of Initial Par-
ticipant Goodwill
In Figure 10, we see that the initial goodwill possessed by potential participants
has a significant impact on the success and sustainability of dynamic ride-sharing
systems. It seems particularly important in the startup phase that potential par-
ticipants continue to place announcements even though they are not matched. It
seems highly likely, therefore, that public incentives might be necessary to initiate a
dynamic ride-sharing system. If participants are discouraged by not finding matches




In this study of dynamic ride-sharing, we have seen that the use of sophisticated
optimization methods substantially increases the likelihood that ride-share matches
can be found for participants, and leads to ride-sharing systems that generate larger
overall system travel cost savings. Furthermore, our simulation studies have shown
that dynamic ride-sharing may have potential for success in large U.S. metropolitan
areas, with sustainable ride-share populations forming over time even with relatively
small overall participation rates and when considering only home-based work trips.
Besides travel costs savings, ride-sharing systems may provide travel time savings
to participants by providing access to high occupancy lanes. Moreover, ride-sharing
may help to decrease traffic congestion and thereby reduce system-wide travel times.
We believe that extending ride-sharing simulation models to explicitly consider time-




SINGLE-RIDER, SINGLE-DRIVER STABLE (AND
NEARLY-STABLE) RIDE-SHARE MATCHING
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, a fundamental assumption is that after a match-making system decides
on good rider-driver matches, each participant accepts his match. This is obviously
optimistic, especially since individual system participants may have motivations for
participating in the system that do not completely align with system-level objectives.
In this chapter, we start to more closely consider the acceptance choices of participants
by attempting to build stable (or nearly-stable) sets of ride-share matches. We define
a set of stable matches to be one where no rider and driver would prefer to be matched
together for a ride-share trip than to their current matches (or, to remain unmatched).
This notion of stability is analogous to that defined in the well-known stable marriage
problem, which will be defined later in this chapter.
For exposition, suppose that each potential participant in a ride-sharing system
has complete visibility of all other participants and all of their relevant information.
Figure 2, then, graphically depicts a scenario where a system-optimal solution is not
stable. A system optimal solution is to assign r1 to d1 and r2 to d2. However, r2
and d1 would both prefer to be matched together than to their current partners. By
sharing a ride, each of these two participants would pay for the equivalent of 4.5
miles of travel if the total benefit of the match (3 miles of savings) were split equally
between them. In the current matches, however, both r2 and d1 pay for 5 miles of
travel.
A class of so-called two-sided matching problems potentially useful for problems
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such as these was introduced by Gale and Shapley [27]. Two-sided matching problems
differ from the classical assignment problem (i.e., jobs are assigned to workers) since
there are participants on both sides of the assignment who care about the outcome
and have the power to reject or abandon the solution proposed by a central planner.
These problems explicitly constrain the solutions found by a central planner so that
groups of matched participants do not have incentive to make private arrangements.
To do so, so-called “stability” constraints are included in formulations in addition
to standard matching constraints. A discussion of the basic theory of two-sided
matching is presented in [58]. In this chapter, we will use some of these ideas to
introduce stability constraints into models for dynamic ride-share matching.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce
a related classical problem: the stable marriage problem. In Section 4.3, we define
the maximum weight stable (and nearly-stable) matching problems for dynamic ride-
sharing. We then design models and solution algorithms specifically for the single-
rider, single-driver matching problem, considering the case where participants have
fixed driver/rider roles and without round trip announcements. In Section 4.4, we
model the participants accept/reject behavior in an unstable ride-sharing system and
study the system performance over time. Finally, in Section 4.5, we make some
concluding remarks.
4.2 Stable Marriage Problem
The stable marriage problem is a classical bipartite matching problem. The original
setting considers two sets of men and women of equal size n. Each person has ranked
all members of the opposite sex with a strict preference number from 1 to n, where
a lower number indicates a stronger preference. The objective is to create a perfect
matching of men and women such that there does not exist any pair of man and
woman who prefer each other to their current partners. If man m and woman w
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forms such a pair, they are called a blocking pair. If there are no blocking pairs in
the matching solution, we call it a stable marriage assignment or stable matching.
It is shown that every instance of the stable marriage problem has a stable match-
ing which can be found in O(n2) time [27]. Vande Vate [66] initiated the study of
the stable marriage problem using a mathematical programming approach. A com-
plete characterization of the convex hull of the stable marriage solution polytope is
established. Rothblum [59] extended the polyhedral description to the case where
the bipartite graph is not complete, and additionally considers scenarios where some
participants would rather remain single than be matched to some participants. A
simpler proof of the primary result in [66] is provided by Roth et al. [57].
When there may exist ties in preference lists, there are three stability notions:
super-stability, strong stability, and weak stability. We introduce some notation be-
fore giving the definitions of these three notions. Let M be a set of men, given by
M = {m1,m2, ...,mp}. Let W be a set of women, given by W = {w1, w2, ...,mq}. A
proposed pair (m,w) in M×W is acceptable if m and w prefer each other to remaining
single. Let A denote the set of acceptable pairs. We now define a matching:
Definition 4.2.1. Matching in Stable Marriage Problems
A matching is a one-to-one mapping µ from M ∪W to itself, such that:
1. µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m, in which case m is matched to w.
2. If µ(m) is not in W , then µ(m) = m, in which case m is unmatched.
3. If µ(w) is not in M , then µ(w) = w, in which case w is unmatched.
We can also define some notation for preferences. The form a >c b denotes that
person c prefers person a to b, and a ≥c b denotes that either a >c b or that person c is
indifferent in preference toward a and b. A matching µ is called individually rational
if no participant a prefers being single (i.e., unmatched) to µ(a). An individually
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rational matching is further defined to be stable if there is no pair (m,w) ∈ A where
w >m µ(m) and m >w µ(w).
Now we can define the three stability notions for problems in which the number of
men p equals the number of women q. Such problems will be referred to as balanced.
First, we define a stable matching in terms of blocking pairs:
Definition 4.2.2. Stable Matching
A matching µ is a stable matching if it contains no blocking pairs.
Definition 4.2.3. Super Stability in Balanced Problems
A stable matching is super-stable if a blocking pair is defined as a pair (m,w) ∈
M ×W where µ(m) 6= w, w ≥m µ(m), and m ≥w µ(w).
Definition 4.2.4. Strong Stability in Balanced Problems
A stable matching is strongly-stable if a blocking pair is defined as a pair (x, y) ∈
(M ×W ) ∪ (W ×M) where µ(x) 6= y, y >x µ(x), and x ≥y µ(y).
Definition 4.2.5. Weak Stability in Balanced Problems
A stable matching is weakly-stable if a blocking pair is defined as a pair (m,w) ∈
M ×W where µ(m) 6= w, w >m µ(m), and m >w µ(w).
For balanced stable marriage problems with potential ties in preference lists, it is
not hard to see that a weakly-stable solution always exists and can be found using
the well-known Gale-Shapley Algorithm. To do so, simply create a strict preference
order for each participant by breaking ties arbitrarily, and apply the algorithm. Any
stable matching found via this approach is weakly stable given the original (non-
strict) preference lists. In contrast, there are instances that have no super-stable nor
strongly-stable matching.
In real world problems, there are not always equal sizes of the bipartite sets. We
can extend the stability concept accordingly.
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Definition 4.2.6. Weak Stability in Unbalanced Problems
A stable matching is weakly-stable in unbalanced problems if a blocking pair is
defined as a pair (m,w) ∈ M × W where µ(m) 6= w, m is either unmatched or
w >m µ(m), and w is either unmatched or m >w µ(w).
It can be shown that for unbalanced problems, there is at least one stable matching
in which all the elements of the smaller set are matched. The Gale-Shapley algorithm
can be applied to find a stable matching with unequal sets with some modifications.
Considering the polyhedral characteristics of stable marriage problem, it is some-
what surprising to notice that the set of stable matchings can be represented as the
extreme points of the set of solutions of a simple system of linear constraints. Let M
and W denote the sets of men and women as defined above. The incidence vector
of a matching µ is a vector x ∈ {0, 1}|M |×|W | such that xm,w = 1 if µ(m) = w and
xm,w = 0, otherwise. In the formulation, the notation j >m w is used to denote
{j ∈ W : j >m w} and i >w m is used to denote {i ∈ M : i >w m}. With this
notation, we can characterize the stable matchings by their configurations as follows.
Theorem 4.2.1. (Roth et al. [57]) A vector x ∈ R|M |×|W | is a stable matching if and
only if it is an integer solution of∑
j∈W
xm,j ≤ 1 ∀ m ∈M (1)
∑
i∈M
xi,w ≤ 1 ∀ w ∈ W (2)
xm,w ≥ 0 ∀ (m,w) ∈M ×W (3)





xi,w + xm,w ≥ 1 ∀ (m,w) ∈ (M ×W ) ∈ A (5)
Constraints (1), (2), and (3) represent matching constraints. Constraints (4) are
called individual rationality constraints. Constraints (5) define the stability con-
straints. They ensure that for each acceptable pair (m,w), either man m marries
67
someone he prefers to woman w, or w marries someone she prefers to m, or m and
w marry each other. Stability constraints prevent (weakly-stable) blocking pairs to
appear. Constraints (1)-(5) define a set of stable fractional matchings. Next, we want
to see that the extreme points of the linear constraints (1)-(5) correspond precisely
to the stable matchings.
It can be shown that the constraint set (1)-(5) has integer-valued extreme points.
An extreme point of a convex set C is a point x ∈ C such that there exists no y ∈ C
and z ∈ C, both different from x, and x = αy + (1− α)z for some 0 < α < 1.
Theorem 4.2.2. (Roth et al. [57]) Let C be the convex polyhedron of solutions to
the linear constraints (1)-(5). Then the integer points of C are precisely its extreme
points. That is, the extreme points of the linear constraints (1)-(5) correspond pre-
cisely to the stable matchings.
In Section 4.3, we will discuss how to apply the ideas of stable marriage problem
to the dynamic ride-sharing problem and tailor it to the specific characteristics found
in the ride-sharing context. We will focus on the ride-sharing setting where single
riders are matched with single drivers for one-way trips and roles are fixed for the
entirety of the stability analysis.
4.3 Stable Matching Problem in Ride-Sharing
It is intuitive to relate the stable marriage problem to the stability notion in ride-
sharing matching problems. In our ride-sharing problem, we have two disjoint sets of
riders and drivers. Assume that they have information about the other participants
and they know the total savings generated by sharing a ride with any other partici-
pant. Each participant has his/her own evaluation of the benefit created by sharing
a ride with a certain partner. We assume that a participant generates his preference
list based on the savings realized by pairing with each participant on the other side.
Higher savings yield stronger preference. For example, r1 can be matched with d1, d2
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and d3. The respective savings for r1 are 3, 1, and 5. Then the preference list for r1
is (2, 1, 3). If there are ties in the preference list, that is, when a rider/diver can see
more than one feasible potential partner that creates the same benefit, we apply weak
stability only for the following analysis. Now we need to consider how to divide the
savings between the participants in each pair. We make the cost division assumption
that each participant in a ride-sharing pair receives half the total savings generated
by this pair. This follows the Shapley value in cooperative game theory. Without
participation in the game with two persons, no one can earn anything. Instead, as
long as one participates, he/she can benefit.
Our analysis focuses on the scenario with home-work trips only and in which each
participant fixes his/her role as a rider or a driver when sending an announcement.
With return trips, the problem becomes more complicated since we need to consider
unstable pairs in both trips, so we do not consider the round trip scenario. In the
analysis that follows, we assume that all participants have complete system-level
information. Thus, if rider i and driver j are match feasible (time feasible with positive
cost savings), then rider i and driver j know about each other and will put each other
in their respective ranked preference lists. Also, we assume that the complete set of
announcements received for a particular day are considered simultaneously. Thus,
the analysis herein will be most similar to the a posteriori case in Chapter 3.
4.3.1 Basic Problem
We now introduce the primary stable ride-sharing matching problem that we will con-
sider in this chapter. This basic problem extends the matching problem in Chapter 3,
maximizing total system vehicle mile savings by creating stable rider-driver matches.
We call this problem the max weight stable matching problem (MWSM) and the










xi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ R (6)∑
i∈R





xi′,j + xi,j ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ A (8)
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ A (9)
Compared to the stable marriage formulation, we omit the individual rationality
constraints (4). The set of acceptable pairs A is simply the set of feasible arcs in our
bipartite graph. In the ride-sharing setting, there could exist ties in arc weights so
we modify the stability constraints (8) to find a weakly stable matching. A minimum
weight stable matching problem (MinWSM) can be found by changing the objective
function to minimizing total vehicle mile savings.
We now present computational results for the basic maximum weight stable match-
ing formulation and compare it with the maximum weight matching and minimum
weight stable matching solutions. Again, we built a simulation exvironment that
considers work trips in Atlanta. Please refer to Section 3.4 for a detailed description.
Various participant rate levels are studied. For each level, we compute the following
statistics: average success rate (S), average total system-wide vehicle miles savings
(M), average individual cost savings per trip (C) in relative form (%) and absolute
form (|·|). |C| stands for the average individual savings in dollars based on an average
per-mile direct cost of $0.54 [3]. The average here is over 5 different announcement
streams.
Table 9 shows that introducing stability constraints reduces the success rate and
vehicle-miles savings. However MWSM gives a better individual cost savings. This is
reasonable since matched participants have relatively good personal savings in stable
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Table 9: Stable Matching Solution Quality Comparison
S (%) M (%) C (%) |C|
—0.5%—
MWM 57.5 18.4 27.1 1.8
MWSM 54.9 17.7 27.3 1.8
MinWSM 54.9 17.7 27.3 1.8
—1%—
MWM 66.0 22.5 28.9 1.9
MWSM 62.7 21.5 29.1 2.0
MinWSM 62.6 21.5 29.1 2.0
—2%—
MWM 73.0 26.3 30.7 2.1
MWSM 69.2 25.1 31.1 2.1
MinWSM 69.1 25.1 31.1 2.1
—4%—
MWM 78.3 29.7 32.6 2.2
MWSM 74.4 28.4 32.9 2.2
MinWSM 74.2 28.3 32.9 2.2
—5%—
MWM 80.0 30.8 33.1 2.2
MWSM 76.1 29.4 33.5 2.2
MinWSM 75.9 29.4 33.5 2.2
matching solutions and this would lead to fewer matched participants and worse
overall system total savings. Increased participation rate yields a higher success rate,
system total savings and personal savings. The difference between MWSM and
MinWSM is very small. This shows stable matching solutions yield similar total
vehicle-miles savings, regardless of the objective function. This observation may be
quite useful, since heuristics may be able to find feasible stable solutions quickly.
To better quantify the difference of MWM from MWSM solutions, we calculate
relative instability gaps (denote Gap(MWM,MWSM) for each of the performance
metrics). The relative gap from b to a is calculated as (b−a)/a×100%. The results are
presented in Table 10. The results show that MWSM does not reduce the success
rate and system-wide vehicle miles savings by more than 5%. Personal savings in
MWSM are no better than 2% in relative form and not better than 1% in absolute
form. This shows that MWSM provides a solution that is very close to the one from
MWM . When varying participant rates, the absolute change values in all statistics
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increase from 0.5% to 2%, and then decrease from 2% to 5%.
Table 10: Relative Gaps Between MWSM and MWM Solutions For Various Per-
formance Metrics
S (%) M (%) C (%) |C|
0.5% -4.6% -3.9% 0.7% 0.7%
1% -5.0% -4.4% 0.8% 0.6%
2% -5.2% -4.5% 1.2% 0.7%
4% -5.0% -4.4% 1.2% 0.7%
5% -4.9% -4.3% 1.2% 0.6%
In the worst case, the instability gap in vehicle mile savings, could be as large as
50% degradation from the MWM objective. An example is shown in Figure 11. The
MWM solution assigns b and c in a match, while in MWSM algorithm, a and b
are in a match and c and d are matched. In this case, the relative instability gap in







Figure 11: An Example Instance with an Instability Gap in System Vehicle Miles
Savings Close to 50%
To further undertstand the stability of an MWM solution, we calculate two statis-
tics. The first one is the proportion of matched participants who are in at least one
blocking pair, and we denote it as B1. It is calculated as the number of unique partic-
ipants in blocking pairs divided by the total number of participants who are assigned
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a match. The second one is the average number of blocking pairs per participant in
a blocking pair, and it is denoted as B2. It is obtained by dividing 2 times the num-
ber of blocking pairs by the number of unique participants in blocking pairs and it
measures the blocking choice density for a blocking participant. Table 11 presents B1
and B2 values for various participant rates. The computational results are averaged
over 5 simulation runs. The results demonstrate that approximately one fifth of the
participants who are assigned a match are in at least one blocking pair in the max
weight matching solution. This proportion does not look small. Nearly 20% matched
participants may therefore have an incentive to reject the match provided by the sys-
tem. The blocking choice density for each blocking participant is not high, however,
does not exceed 2. This shows that on average, each participant who is involved in
blocking pair(s) has no more than 2 better alternative candidates than the system’s
assignment.
Table 11: Blocking Pairs in Max Weight Matching
0.5% 1% 2% 4% 5%
B1 (%) 15 19 21 23 23
B2 (%) 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4
To understand the graph structure of the matching problems that are solved for
these ride-sharing applications, we present the distribution of feasible matches in a
relative frequency histogram in Figure 12. It records the number of feasible matches
for each participant. A participation rate of 2% is used and the results are averaged
over 5 announcement streams. We observe that each participant has a very limited
number of feasible matches. With a participation rate of 2%, there are more than
10,000 drivers and riders respectively in the system, but few participants have more
than 300 feasible matches. More than 40% of the participants have no more than 10
feasible options, and 28% participants have no more than 5 feasible options. Fewer
than 20% of participants have more than 50 options. To explain this, remember
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that to establish a feasible match, we need to satisfy two conditions: time feasible
and positive cost savings. People are more likely to be matched with those who
announce with similar departure times. Also, in order to create positive savings, the
driver’s original trip distance has to be greater than the sum of distance between
driver and rider origins and the distance between driver and rider destinations. Both
factors clearly limit the number of feasible matches for either a driver or a rider.
On the other hand, the number of feasible matches seems to be clearly sufficient to
provide alternative candidates for victims creating when constraints are introduced
to prevent blocking pairs, as in the MWSM formulation. This is evidenced by the
fact that we obtain a less than 5% instability gap in vehicle miles savings even though
around 20% of the participants are in blocking pairs when constraints are not used
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Figure 12: Distribution of Feasible Matches in A Posteriori Ride-Share Matching
Problems
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Next we study the impact on stable solution quality by changing the time flexibility
for participants. As a reminder, a time flexibility specifies the difference between the
earliest departure time and latest departure time for an announcement. By default,
the time flexibility is set as 20 minutes. The instability gaps between MWM and
MWSM in S, M , C and |C| are calculated; note that the objective is to maximize
vehicle miles savings. Computational results for a 0.5% participant rate are shown in
Table 12. In all the cases, the system’s performance in success rate S and total vehicle
mile savings M are very close. Slightly better individual savings are realized with the
MWSM model. With less time flexibility, participants are less likely to have many
feasible matches due to the strict time constraints. The number of blocking pairs is
likely to be limited in this case; thus the instability gap stays small. With greater
time flexibility, the number of blocking pairs increases and a larger instability gap is
obtained. But, when the time flexibility becomes very large, there are many feasible
matches for each participant. More feasible choices provide more options to form a
stable matching with good total savings and the instability gap could decrease.
Table 12: Instability Gaps Between MWSM and MWM Solutions under Different
Time Flexibility
time flex S (%) M (%) C (%) |C|
5 min -3.3% -2.3% 0.6% 1.0%
10 min -4.5% -3.7% 0.2% 0.7%
20 min -4.6% -3.9% 0.7% 0.7%
50 min -4.4% -4.0% 0.7% 0.4%
100 min -4.5% -4.0% 1.2% 0.5%
200 min -4.2% -3.7% 1.0% 0.6%
It seems that varying the time flexibility of participants does not substantially
impact in the instability gap. We further consider relaxing the time feasibility con-
straints totally, in which case a feasible match is established if and only if matching
the pair produces positive savings. In such a setting, only geographical information
decides the feasible matches. We associate a probability p ∈ (0, 1] with each feasible
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match to decide the likelihood for this match to appear. Table 13 presents the insta-
bility gap in S, M , C and |C| with a 0.5% participant rate. With different density of
feasible matches, a similar pattern is observed as in Table 12. Instability gap in all
the four statistics stays small. This shows that the small instability gap is probably
independent of the timing information but due to the geographical property of our
ride-sharing settings.
Table 13: MWSM Degradation without Time Feasibility Constraints
p S (%) M (%) C (%) |C|
—0.2— -4.3% -3.8% 1.1% 0.5%
—0.4— -4.4% -3.9% 1.0% 0.4%
—0.6— -4.6% -3.8% 1.4% 0.8%
—0.8— -4.4% -3.8% 1.1% 0.7%
—1.0— -4.2% -3.7% 1.1% 0.5%
To further investigate participants in blocking pairs, we study the incentives from
leaving the system’s assignment for each participant in any blocking pair. For each
participant in any potential blocking pair, we calculate the saving gains needed to
prevent the blocking pair from leaving the current system solution. The distribution
of distance savings in vehicle-miles for 2% participant rate is plotted in Figure 13. It
seems that most of the participants in blocking pairs have vehicle miles saving gains
in the low range of the histogram. Specifically, nearly 50% saving gains lie in the
range of no more than 0.5 miles. More than 70% blocking options have no more than
1 mile in savings. From Table 9, we know that matched participants can earn around
2 dollars on average for 2% partcipant rate. Assuming an average per-mile direct cost
of $0.54 [3], saving 0.5 miles brings around 25 cents of savings. This is approximately
one eighth of the average savings and people may not consider it attractive. Thus, it
is useful to study the case when a relaxed stable matching solution is considered and
we solve a nearly-stable matching problem. Note also that tiny incentives to leave the
system’s assignment would lead to big degradation in system total savings as seen in
76
Figure 11. However, we observe a degradation in less than 5%. This is probably due
to the fact that participants often have enough feasible candidates as backups. In the
example in Figure 11, while b and c establish a matching pair, a and d are typically
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Figure 13: Benefits from Forming a Blocking Pair
4.3.2 Nearly-stable Problem
Adding stability constraints which prevent all possible blocking pairs is an extreme
approach to introduce stability into ride-sharing matching formulations. It is natural
to think of a method that could balance the total system benefit with the stability of
the solution, which is a proxy for how acceptable the solution may be to participants.
The first method is to relax the objective to reach optimality. Instead of requiring
solutions which provide the maximum total vehicle miles savings, an inferior near
optimal objective value may be acceptable which minimizes also some measure of the
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instability. The second method is to relax the stability constraints, and redefine the
blocking pairs that the formulation prevents from existing in an optimal solution.
4.3.2.1 Near-optimal Least Unstable Formulation
In this section, we describe an approach for finding nearly-stable solutions by bound-
ing the maximum objective function deviation from that of an unstable optimal so-
lution. A two stage method is employed. In stage one, we solve the standard max
weight matching problem and denote the objective value as O. In stage two, we min-
imize the total penalty
∑
(i∈R,j∈D) yi,j and set a parameter β ∈ [0, 1] for controlling
the maximum deviation that we allow from the unstable optimal objective function.
The term yij will penalize the creation of a blocking pair for participants i and j.
The complete algorithm (denoted MWNSM1) is as follows:
Stage 1: Solve max weight matching problem, denote the objective value as O.








xi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ R (10)∑
i∈R
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ D (11)






xi′,j + xi,j) ∀(i, j) ∈ A (12)∑
i∈R,j∈D
ci,jxi,j ≥ βO (13)
xi,j, yi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ (R×D), β ∈ [0, 1] (14)
The objective function aims to minimize total number of blocking pairs. Con-
straints (10) and (11) are matching constraints. Constraints (12) measure the viola-
tion of stability constraints. If i and j form a blocking pair, yi,j is enforced to be 1.
Constraints (13) controls the lower bound of total weight of the matching solution.
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It can not degrade more than (1-β) from the maximum weight. If β is 1, we want to
maintain unstable optimality. We are solving a stable matching problem when β is
set to 0.
Table 14: Max Weight Nearly Stable Matching MWNSM1 Blocking Pairs Statistics
β 1 0.99
] blocking pairs 2381 726
] participants in blocking pairs 3519 1326
B1 (%) 20 8
Table 14 presents the results with β = 1 and 0.99 for a participant rate of 2%.
The results are averaged over 5 announcement streams. We can see that by com-
promising 1% of the optimal objective value, the number of participants in blocking
pairs decreases more than 60% and the number of blocking pairs decreases even more
(up to 70%) due to the fact that a participant could be in more than one pair. The
proportion of participants in blocking pairs also decreases from 20% to 8% compared
to the total number of matched participants. This experiment appears to indicate
that most of the blocking pairs do not greatly degrade the system’s total savings.
Note also that the average optimal system-wide vehicle-miles savings over 5 simula-
tion runs is approximately 66,450 miles. By 1% miles savings, we can remove about
2000 participants from blocking pairs. Thus, it is not very costly in terms of system
objective function degradation to create a much more stable system.
4.3.2.2 Relax stability constraints
As indicated in Figure 13, most of the participants in blocking pairs gain less than
1 mile in savings from leaving the system’s assignment and matching instead with
their partner in a blocking pair. Therefore, it may be useful to consider an alternative
model in which blocking pairs are redefined based on some notion of what savings
gains can be reasonably perceived by participants. Instead of preventing any blocking
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pairs to appear by stability constraints (8), we could allow the existence in a solution
of some blocking pairs where the participants would not benefit much from leaving
the system’s assignments.








xi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ R (15)∑
i∈R





xi′,j + xi,j ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ A (17)
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ (R×D), ε ≥ 0 (18)
Compared with MWSM formulation, the difference lies in the definition of the
stability constraints. Constraints (17) are called near-stability constraints and a tol-
erance value ε is added. They ensure that for each acceptable pair (i, j), either rider
i is matched with someone with miles savings not ε worse than driver j, or driver j
is matched with someone with miles savings not ε worse than rider i, or rider i and
driver j are matched. Note that when ε goes to infinity, we create a MWM optimal
solution and when ε is 0, we solve a MWSM problem.
Table 15 presents the number of blocking pairs, the number of parcitipants in
blocking pairs and the relative instability gap in system total vehicle miles savings.
A participant rate of 2% is used and the results are averaged over 5 announcement
streams. We set ε as 0.5 and 1.0 miles seperately. When ε is 0, we are solving a max
weight stable matching problem. There is no blocking pair and the instability gap is
-4.5%. When ε is infinity, we are solving a max weight matching problem in which
case we generate the maximum number of blocking pairs and an instability gap of
zero. By allowing 0.5 miles tolerance, more than 70% blocking pairs and participants
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in blocking pairs appear in the system, and we achieve nearly 90% optimality in the
system total vehicle-miles savings. If people only perceive a blocking pair when the
saving is larger than 1 mile, then we create more than 90% of the total blocking
pairs and the system total savings nearly reaches the max weight matching optimum.
To interpret these results, note that we can say the system is essentially stable if
participants cannot perceive blocking pairs with partners that generate only 1 mile of
additional savings (beyond the system match). And, since only approximately 700 of
the 2400 blocking pairs remain when participants cannot perceive blocking partners
that yield only 0.5 miles of savings, using this parameter setting generates a nearly
stable solution with very little total degradation in the objective value.
Table 15: Max Weight Nearly Stable Matching MWNSM2 Blocking Pairs Statistics
ε 0 0.5 1.0 infinity
] blocking pairs 0 1698 2197 2381
] participants in blocking pairs 0 2748 3338 3519
Gap(MWM, MWSM) -4.5% -1.2% -0.3% 0
4.3.3 Greedy Algorithm
In this section, we show that a classical greedy heuristic method actually provides
a stable matching solution. The greedy algorithm is a common heuristic to find a
matching solution in a bipartite graph. It works as follows. Given a set SA of active
announcements, we determine for each rider announcement r the driver announcement
d (if any) that represents a feasible match with the largest possible savings. Among all
of these matches, we then select (rm, dm) with the largest savings and fix it. Requests
rm and dm are then removed from SA, and the process is repeated until no positive
savings matches remain.
We claim that the greedy algorithm finds a stable matching solution. To under-
stand this, assume we have a greedy matching solution s′ which is not stable. Then
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there must exist a blocking pair (b1, b2). Suppose b1 is currently assigned to b2′ and
b2 is assigned to b1′, then weight with pair (b1, b2′) and (b1′, b2) must be both smaller
than that with (b1, b2). This is a contradiction since otherwise (b1, b2) should have
been assigned before the other two pairs were assigned. Since the max weight sta-
ble matching and the minimum weight stable matching provide very close solutions
as shown in Table 9, we do not provide extra computational results for the stable
matching solutions provided by the greedy algorithm.
4.4 Simulation in System Dynamics with Unstable Partic-
ipants
In this section, we consider a system in which the participants are able to reject an
assignment from the system if it is not stable. We attempt to build a reasonable
ride-sharing system over time and to realistically model participants’ accept/reject
interaction. As the participation days accumulate, a user could collect knowledge
about who would be a good candidate to ride with based on previous ride-sharing
experience. We study how a ride-sharing system evolves over time in this setting,
where we assume that participants who have met before (in a ride-share) may leave
the system matching if they are in blocking pairs.
For each participant i, we maintain a backup list. Whenever participant j suc-
cessfully shares a ride with participant i, we put j into i’s backup list. These are
the participants that i knows. Now, each time i gets an assignment from the system,
he/she will check his/her backup list to decide whether to accept or reject it. If i has
a better candidate from his backup list who is time feasible and prefers i as well, the
system’s assignment is turned down.
Consider then a system that operates as follows:
• Participants make announcements.
• The system makes assignments based on max weight matching algorithm and
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sends the assignments to participants involved.
• Each participant, in order of his announcement time, checks his backup list to
decide whether to accept or to reject the system’s assignment based on Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Participants Accept/Reject Behavior Simulation
Sort all announcements in announcement time ascending order
Denote the set of the announcements as Na. Announcement time of a is denoted
as T (a). If i < j, then T (i) < T (j), where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |Na|.
for i = 1 to |Na| do
if There exists a partner j assigned to i then
if j is available then
Check backup list of i
if There exists b in backup list better than j then
Finalize match i and b, mark them as unavailable
else
Check backup list of j
if There does not exist b in the backup list where j prefers b to i then




Check backup list of i
if There exists b in backup list who has i better than his current partner
then




Check backup list of i
if There exists b in backup list who has i better than his current partner then




In Algorithm 1, we maintain a backup list for each participant. When looking
through the backup list, we assume that people pick the available candidate providing
the best benefits. Note that not all the candidates in the backup list are available.
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The reason candidate j in i’s backup list may not be available for i could be that the
time is not feasible for the pair on the current day or an alternative assignment has
already been finalized for j. Even if j is available, the match i and j can be established
only when i and j prefer each other over current system’s assignment if there is any.
Note that Algorithm 1 is a simplification of an exhaustive search algorithm where i
and j form a match only when they are both best available from each other’s backup
lists. This simplified approach matches the first blocking pair during the process of
traversing the participant list. This is a reasonable setup since people may not be
patient enough to wait for the best candidate, but are probably willing to investigate
some alternative options if a ride-matching system creates questionable matches.
In the following experiments, we simulate a system with Atlanta data described
in Chapter 3.4 over a two month period. The setup is the same as those in Chapter
4.3. Only the home-work trips are considered and each participant has fixed roles.
The whole set of announcements is received before the start of the current day. A
participant rate of 1% is used for the following analysis if not otherwise stated. We
generate the announcements for consecutive days as follows. First, we determine a set
of potential home-work trips using the methods described in Chapter 3.4. For each
potential participant, a base latest departure time is drawn from a normal distribution
with a mean of 7:30 a.m. and standard deviation of 1 hour. For each following day,
a normal distribution with this base departure time as the mean and a standard
deviation of 10 minutes is drawn for each participant.
We now provide computational results to understand the system dynamics with
participants accept/reject behavior modeled as described. First, we assess the total
system savings in miles each day from the max weight matching formulation, the
max weight matching with participants accept/reject behavior stated in Algorithm 1
(denoted AR), and the max weight stable matching formulation.
Comparative results are summarized in Figure 14, where the relative system total
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savings to the MWM upper bound is plotted over time. For day 1, participants have
no candidate in the backup list so they accept the options assigned by the system and
we have exactly the same total savings in AR as in MWM . From day 2, with more
new people entering the backup lists of participants, people are more likely to reject
the system’s assignment and this makes the total system savings worsen. After about
two weeks, the system with accept/reject behavior seems to reach a steady state.
This is probably because people have already met nearly all the possible candidates
and the system could be saturated.
Also, it is interesting that the AR line crosses with the line MWSM at days 3
and 4. From day 4, the MWSM line stays above. The explanation is that without
enough candidates in backup list in the early days, the system’s MWM assignment
still dominates candidates in the backup lists and AR provides better total savings
than MWSM . Note that in MWSM solution, we establish stability over all feasible
matches, not only the set of people who know each other based on their knowledge
accumulated from previous days. After day 4, worse system savings result from more
participants making private arrangements. The average degradation of AR from
the MWM savings averaged over 60 days is 7%, while the average degradation for
MWSM is 5%.
On each day, it is very unlikely that a participant could have all the feasible
candidates in his/her backup list due to the limited way a connection is established:
by only successful previous rides. To determine the maximum degradation, then we
set up a scenario when the full backup list is considered every day for each participant.
That is, each participant has exactly the same visibility as the system for feasible
matches. We denote this case as AR(full).
Figure 15 presents relative instability gap of system total savings between ac-
cept/reject behavior setup (AR or AR(full)) and MWM respectively in 60 days.
















































Figure 14: System Savings Dynamics with Accept/Reject Behavior Modeling
scenario (AR or AR(full)) and MWM divided by the savings in MWM . The AR
line starts from 0 as the backup list accumulates and it is empty at day 1. However the
AR(full) line starts from around 8% since the backup list is constructed based on the
feasible matches for each day from day 1. The average degradation from MWM for
AR(full) is around 8%, which is about 1% worse than AR. It shows that full visibil-
ity of feasible matches by participants would lead to worse system performance with
regard to the system-wide total savings compared with limited knowledge. This is
reasonable since more information about backup candidates is obtained each day, and
more participant involvement could lead to a worse system performance in total sav-
ings. What is interesting, however, is that even a backup list generated sequentially
between participants successfully matched together creates almost as bad degradation
as the complete information backup list.
In the experiments above, we set the standard deviation to 10 minutes in the
normal distribution from which we draw the latest departure time. To understand the
impacts to the system when participants have different time schedules, we conduct an

























































Figure 15: System Savings Dynamics in Accept/Reject Behavior Modeling with Full
Backup List
deviation as std. We test 4 scenarios where std is set to 2, 5, 10 and 30 respectively.
The instability gaps are calculated for each day and presented in consecutive 60 days
in Figure 16.
Our first observation is the slope differences of the lines at the beginning of the
simulation days. The slope shows the system performance degradation speed. A
standard deviation of 2 minutes has a smaller slope compared to the case in standard
deviation of 5 minutes, which is smaller than that of 10 minutes. However, when
the time window size becomes too large where standard deviation is 30 minutes, the
slope becomes the smallest among all the four cases. The reason that the system
worsens slowly in std = 2 case is that with small variation of announcement timing,
participants gradually meet other participants. Thus, they are less likely to have
enough candidates from their backup list to possibly reject the system’s assignment.
When people have larger variation in announcement timing (std = 5 and std = 10),
they recognize more new people sooner and the system’s MWM solution would more





















































Figure 16: System Savings Dynamics with Accept/Reject Behavior Modeling in
Different Timing Variation
time window grows too large, participants can not make use of their backup list since
their time schedules jump unpredictably and it is very likely that they miss those
candidates due to time infeasibility.
Our second observation is the height of the lines in the time span. With std = 2,
the line is lower than those in larger standard deviations. This is probably due to the
limited candidates met with the small announcement timing variation, which leads
to limited damage to the system. With more time flexibility, a worse system total
savings could result as people have more of candidates in their backup lists. This
shows that if people have rigid time schedules, even if they have the ability to reject
the system’s assignment when there is a blocking pair, the system’s performance can
not deteriorate much due to people’s limited access to available matching choices.
Participants may not want to reject the system’s max weight matching assignment
if there is a blocking pair since the saving differences in the two choices might be very
close, as seen in Section 4.3.2.2. Also, rejecting the system guaranteed choice would
bring extra time and effort costs since people need to find alternative candidates by
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themselves. It is reasonable to consider the situation when participants only regard
benefits of constructing a blocking pair above a certain threshold as perceivable. We
can associate a tolerance value when comparing the savings from the system and the
blocking pair options. We define such tolerance in miles denoted as tol. Rider r
considers driver d1 better than d2 if and only if the savings in miles with d1 is tol
better than the one with d2.
Figure 17 presents the MWSM and AR in the case when the tolerance is 0 and
0.5 respectively. By relaxing the blocking pair definition in this way, the system total
mile savings are less impacted. Averaged over 60 days, the instability gap to MWM




















































Figure 17: System Savings Comparison with Tolerance in Savings
4.5 Conclusions
In this study of ride-sharing problem, we analyze the stable matching problems based
on home-based work trips with fixed rider/driver roles. With the simulation of Atlanta
travel data, we observe a noticeable deterioration in ride-sharing system performance
with unstable matching assignments. The system total savings could be degraded by
89
up to 5% with max weight stable matching model in Atlanta travel data simulation. A
larger instability gap has not been observed which may due to the geographical struc-
ture of our ride-sharing problem. Each participant’s feasible matches are constrained
within local groups of neighbours. Due to the abundance of local feasible alternatives,
blocking pairs would not bring fatal damage to the system’s total benefits.
We further study the system dynamics over a number of simulation days with
participants who could reject the matching assignments if they are not stable. The
system’s total benefits deteriorate around 7% from max weight matching optimal
objective values, which is worse than the performance provided by the max weight
stable matching algorithm. When more feasible match information is revealed to
participants, they may make decisions that move the system into an even worse
situation. This shows that applying a stable matching algorithm is beneficial to
prevent blocking pairs. If people are assigned only stable matchings by the system
in which case no private match making would bring more benefits, the ride-sharing
system could be more trustworthy and sustainable.
Moreover, we observe that participants’ time schedule flexibility plays an impor-
tant role in influencing the system dynamics. Note also that people may not want to
announce everyday and it is interesting to study the system dynamics with respect
to the participants’ announcing frequency.
With only home-based work trips with fixed rider/driver roles, it seems not costly
to find a stable matching solution. When considering work-home trips and partici-
pants’ flexibility in roles, the problem could become more complex. We believe that
incorporating round trip constraints and flexible participants’ roles into the stable
matching setting could be an interesting future research area.
90
CHAPTER V
MECHANISM DESIGN IN CHOICE ASSIGNMENT
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider another set of sophisticated ride-share settings where
participants are not assumed to accept each match to which they are assigned. In
such settings, we present users with a menu of possible ride-share matches from
which they can choose. This is basically the idea of mechanism design, i.e., designing
the operational rules of the system to induce desirable behaviour from individual
participants even if they follow selfish motives. The choices in the menu presented to
potential matching participants are different in vehicle-miles savings. The objective
of the system decision maker is to maximize the system’s total vehicle-miles savings
while each user wants to maximize their own savings when making a choice. In order
to simulate participants’ reaction to a menu of matching choices, two scenarios are
considered. One is to assume that each participant chooses the option with highest
vehicle-miles savings. In this scenario, people only care about the savings they can
realize. The other one is to associate a probability for each option from the menu.
The assumption is that people also consider other facts to establish a match besides
economic benefits. We derive mathematical models and test the computational results
on a complete bipartite graph.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we for-
mally define the problem. Section 5.3 present mathematical models with solution
approaches. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.4.
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5.2 Problem Statement
It is not necessary to assign every participant a menu of choices. We define those
users who receive a choice menu as active users. Users who are assumed to accept a
match if assigned are defined as inactive users.
The decision process can be divided into 3 stages:
• Stage 1: the system assigns a menu of matching choices to active users;
• Stage 2: each active user picks one choice from the menu;
• Stage 3: the system collects the selected choices from active users at Stage
2, based on which matching assignments are finalized with the objective of
maximizing the system-wide vehicle-miles.
Specifically, we consider a setting with an equal number of rider and driver trips,
and any pair of (rider, driver) trips creates a feasible match. This is equivalent to a
complete m ×m bipartite graph G whose bipartition is the set of rider trips I and
the set of driver trips J . We generate the weight for an arc as an integer uniformly
drawn from 1 to 100, where the weight represents the savings created by matching
the pair. For each left hand side node (active user), no two feasible matches will yield
the same total savings for simplicity. To allocate the cost savings within a pair, we
divide the total system’s savings equally between the pair of participants. That is,
for a pair (i, j), where i ∈ I and j ∈ J , if the system’s benefits by matching the pair
is s, then we assume that user i and j can receive s/2 savings each.
At Stage 1, we assume that the active users are all the rider trips I. Since we have
a complete bipartite graph, each rider would have at most m feasible match choices.
The system determines the subset of choices to present to each rider.
Users’ behavior in Stage 2 plays a key role in determining the system outcome.
One realistic assumption is that people always pick the choice with best savings. We
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denote this scenario as choice with certainty. In such a setting, people only care about
the economic benefits. We can also assume that people take into account other factors
besides the economic benefits and have a certain likelihood to pick each choice. This
is denoted as the choice with uncertainty scenario. It is reasonable to assign an equal
number of choices to each active user, which we denote by ξ. Specifically, we consider
scenarios where ξ = 2.
In choice with certainty scenario, we solve a deterministic problem and the objec-
tive is to maximize the system’s total vehicle-miles savings. In choice with uncertainty
scenario, a stochastic optimization problem is considered and the objective is to max-
imize the expected system’s total savings.
5.3 Mathematical Model and Solution Approaches
5.3.1 Choice With Certainty
We now present a model for providing a menu of choices to a user where we assume
that each user will select the presented choice with largest savings. In this scenario,
the maximum objective function value can be attained when each active participant
chooses such an option that leads to a maximum weight matching solution on G.
Such a solution is not always attainable. If the minimum savings option of rider
i with driver j is in maximum weight matching solution, then pair i, j will never
exist in the final matched solution for this scenario. It is still relatively easy to solve
this problem. We claim that Algorithm 2 finds an optimal solution in choice with
certainty scenario.
Denote the arc set by A and the weight on arc (i, j) ∈ A by ci,j. For each i ∈ I,
denote the arc connected to i with smallest weight as smi, that is smi = {(i, j) ∈
A|ci,j ≤ ci,k,∀(i, k) ∈ A}, where i ∈ I. Denote |I| = |J | = m. The algorithm is
described in Algorithm 2:
Claim 5.3.1. Algorithm 2 provides an optimal solution.
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Algorithm 2 Polynomial Algorithm for Optimal Solution in Choice With Certainty
Scenario
Find set Q1, where Q1 = {smi,∀i ∈ I}. G′ = (V,A′), where A′ = A\Q1.
Solve max weight matching problem on G′. Denote the set of arcs in optimal
solution by Q2.
if |Q2| = m then
Return Q1 ∪Q2
end if
if |Q2| < m then
Let the set of left hand side nodes not matched be denoted set P . For each
node in P , choose any adjacent arc not in Q1 and save those arcs in Q3. Return
Q1 ∪Q2 ∪Q3
end if
Proof. It is easy to see that arcs in Q1 cannot appear in any optimal solution since
every participant i ∈ I always chooses the larger weight arc option. Thus, to solve
the problem on graph G is equivalent to solve the problem on graph G′. If we obtain
a perfect matching from G′, then options in Q1 combined with options in Q2 provide
an optimal solution. If a perfect matching is not obtained from G′, we claim that
Q1 ∪ Q2 ∪ Q3 is an optimal solution. To prove the claim, we only need to prove
that to solve the max weight matching problem on G′ is equivalent to solve the max
weight matching problem on Q2 ∪ Q3. This is true since Q2 ∪ Q3 is a subset of the
arc set of G′, and Q2 is an optimal matching on G′.
5.3.1.1 Extension to > 2 Choices
When participants are given more than two choices, we can create an integer pro-
gramming formulation P1 for the choice with certainty problem as follows:
xij =
 1 if arc (i, j) is chosen in Stage 10 otherwise
yij =
 1 if arc (i, j) is chosen in Stage 20 otherwise
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zij =
 1 if arc (i, j) is chosen in Stage 30 otherwise








xij = ξ ∀i ∈ I (20)
yij ≤ xij ∀j ∈ J, i ∈ I (21)∑
j∈J
cijyij ≥ cijxij ∀j ∈ J, i ∈ I (22)∑
j∈J
yij = 1 ∀i ∈ I (23)
zij ≤ yij ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (24)∑
j∈J
zij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I (25)∑
i∈I
zij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J (26)
x, y, z binary (27)
The objective in choice with certainty scenario (19) is to maximize total savings
created by the Stage 3 decision variables. Constraint (20) ensures each participant
in I is assigned ξ options at Stage 1. Constraints (21),(22) and (23) enforce that at
Stage 2 each active participant chooses the matching option with largest savings from
the ξ options. Constraints (25) and (26) are the matching constraints for Stage 3.
Note that when ξ = 1, the formulation is equivalent to solving a maximum weight
matching problem on G. This is an upper bound (denoted UB) on system-wide
vehicle-miles savings. When ξ = m, where m > 1, the system will perform worse
since users have the most flexibility to make choice. We test graph sizes from 3 to
12 and vary the parameter ξ from 1 to m. If not stated otherwise, the following
computational results are averaged over 50 random graph samples. As a reminder,
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the weight for an arc is generated as an integer uniformly drawn from 1 to 100, where
the weight represents the savings created by matching the pair. For each active user,
no two feasible matches will yield the same total savings. The ratio (in %) between
the objective value of model (19) and the maximum weight matching UB is calculated
for each parameter setting. The results are presented in Table 16.
Table 16: Solution Quality under Different Choice Menu Sizes
ξ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
m = 3 100 97.9 82.9
m = 4 100 99.5 96.0 74.2
m = 5 100 99.9 99.6 95.1 77.9
m = 6 100 100.0 99.9 98.2 94.8 74.5
m = 7 100 100 100.0 99.9 99.2 92.2 70.6
m = 8 100 100 100 100.0 99.5 97.8 90.9 71.1
m = 9 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.2 97.7 91.5 71.5
m = 10 100 100 100 100 100.0 99.9 99.1 97.4 89.2 69.8
m = 11 100 100 100 100 100 99.9 99.8 99.4 96.8 90.0 68.4
m = 12 100 100 100 100 100.0 99.9 99.8 99.6 99.2 97.6 89.5 69.0
When ξ = 1, the objective value is exactly equal to UB and the ratio is 100%.
When ξ is small, the quality of the solution remains very close to that of the max
weight matching upper bound solution. As ξ gets larger, the gap from the UB
increases. Also note that when dealing with larger graphs with more choices per
participant, the flexibility of the participant decision makers does not lead to large
degradation from UB. For example, when m = 10, by assigning up to 4 choices to
each left hand side node, we could still achieve the upper bound value.
5.3.2 Choice With Uncertainty
Assuming that participants will always select the maximum value matching option
from a menu is naive. Not only are participants motivated by factors and constraints
other than economic reward, but it is also possible that they will begin to look for
ways to game the selection choice if they find that they are frequently not matched
at all when they select the maximum value option. In this section, we initiate a
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study of a system where participants may have some probability of not selecting the
maximum value matching option presented to them. In such settings, the objective
of the system is to present choices to participants that optimize the expected total
savings. We formulate the problem as a two-stage stochastic optimization model.
Stochastic optimization provides a means to deal with uncertainty in optimiza-
tion problems. Uncertainty is modeled by assuming probability distributions on the
parameters of the problem. For an introduction, please refer to [13]. It has important
application in transportation models, logistics, network design, etc. A widely-used
model is a two-stage recourse model. In such a model, the decision maker must fix
so-called first stage decisions now given uncertainty about the second stage; in the sec-
ond stage, additional variables may model decisions that are made after uncertainty is
revealed. The objective then is to choose the first-stage actions in order to minimize
the expected total cost incurred, given the recourse decisions (and their costs) that
are made under each realization of uncertainty. Stochastic optimization problems are
often computationally very difficult, and often more difficult than their deterministic
counterparts. The computational difficulty often arises from the fact that the distri-
bution assigns a non-zero probability to an exponential number of scenarios, which
leads to a huge increase in the problem complexity.
Recently there has been a growing interest in two-stage stochastic combinatorial
optimization problems. Kong and Schaefer ([37]) introduces a two-stage stochastic
max weight matching problem. In their problem, each edge has two weights, a first-
stage weight and a discretely distributed second stage weight. The decision in first-
stage is to choose a matching in the graph. Then, a scenario of the second-stage
edge weight is revealed. The second-stage decision is to choose a matching over those
vertices not matched by the first-stage matching. The objective is to maximize the
total expected edge weight. They proved this problem is NP-hard and provided a
factor 1
2
approximation algorithm. Escoffier ([24]) improves the approximation ratio
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and tackles the max weight spanning tree problem in the two-stage setting.
The first-stage decision of our problem is to pick η options to form a menu for
each active user. For problems with η = 2, as long as the two options are decided,
if we assume that we know the probability associated with each of the choices then
we have 2m scenarios at stage 2. Our objective is to maximize this expected savings
over all the two option assignments in Stage 1.
5.3.2.1 Model Formulation
Consider a problem of assigning η = 2 choices to each participant in a m×m bipartite
matching scenario. Let S be the set of all possible scenarios revealed after the two
options are fixed for Stage 1. Since every left hand side node decision maker has
two options, |S| = 2m. Now denote 1 as the case that the larger savings option is
chosen and 0 as the case that the smaller savings option is chosen. For example, when
m = 3, S={(0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,0), (1,0,1), (1,1,0), (1,1,1)}. We now
consider an important simplification. Suppose that independent of the actual savings
values provided by the two options, we assume that the probability of choosing the
larger of the two options is fixed and known for each participant. Then, for the two
options provided, we associate a probability η for a active user to choose the larger
savings option and 1-η to choose the one with smaller savings.
In Stage 2, we solve |S| = 8 subgraphs each by a max weight matching algorithm
to determine the system outcome under each of the participant choice scenarios.
Combined with the probability to reach each subgraph, that is the choice outcome
of the participants, we can calculate the expectation of the max weight matching
objective value. The objective is to maximize this expectation value over all possible
η = 2 assignments in Stage 1.
To incorporate the scenario that smaller weight arc could be chosen, we partition
the set I into two subsets defined as below:
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Is+: index set of left hand side nodes that have chosen higher weight arc in scenario
s, s ∈ S.
Is−: index set of left hand side nodes that have chosen lower weight arc in scenario
s, s ∈ S.
For example, if s = (0, 0, 1), then Is+ = {3}, meaning left hand side node 3 is in
set Is+, I
s
− = {1, 2}, which indicates that left hand side nodes 1 and 2 are in set Is−.
Note that the union of set Is+ and I
s
− denotes the a complete set of left hand nodes.
Mathematically, define
s(i) =
 1 if the i-th element of scenario vector s is 1, s ∈ S, i ∈ I0 if the i-th element of scenario vector s is 0, s ∈ S, i ∈ I
Is+ = {i ∈ I|s(i) = 1, s ∈ S}
Is− = {i ∈ I|s(i) = 0, s ∈ S}














xij = 2 ∀i ∈ I (29)








ij ≤ cijxij +M(1− xij) ∀j ∈ J, i ∈ Is−, s ∈ S (32)∑
j∈J
ysij = 1 ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S (33)
zsij ≤ ysij ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, s ∈ S (34)∑
j∈J
zsij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S (35)∑
i∈I
zsij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J, s ∈ S (36)
ps = η
|Is+|(1− η)|Is−| (37)
x, y, z binary, M is a big number (38)
The objective is to maximize the expected max weight matching objective values
over 2m scenarios, in which ps is the probability that scenario s appears. For example,
if s = (1, 0, 1), then ps = η
2(1 − η). Constraints are similar to those in P1. The
differences lie in constraints (32). They represent the cases when users choose the
smaller savings option. Note that there are exponential number of terms in objective
function and constraints since there are 2m choice scenarios.. To solve the problem
directly is hard and approximation methods are needed.
5.3.2.2 Solution Approach
The fact the model P2 has an exponential number of terms in the objective and
constraints makes solving it directly a hard task. A Monte Carlo simulation based
approach can be applied to solve an approximation problem. The basic idea is to
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generate a random sample and approximate the expected value function by the cor-
responding sample average function. This is denoted as SAA [36]. We also derive a
series of construction methods to find a two choice assignment based on the graph
structure. All the computational results are averaged over 50 random graph instances.
The averaged computational time in seconds is denoted as t. An upper bound is the
max weight matching objective value, which is denoted as ṽ.
Solve P2 directly Due to the exponential number of terms in P2, the complexity
makes solving P2 not easy in practice so we only report results for the smallest of
graphs, with m ranging from 3 to 7 participants on each side of the bipartition. We
denote the average objective value of P2 as v∗ over 50 graph instances. Table 17
presents v∗ relative to ṽ in percentages with η = 0.9 and 0.6. We observe that η = 0.9
case has v∗ closer to the upper bound compared with η = 0.6 case for each graph
instance. This is reasonable since there is a higher probability to choose the higher
savings choice in η = 0.9 case and this leads to a higher expected value in P2. We can
also find that the averag elapsed time in η = 0.9 case is shorter than that for η = 0.6
case. This shows that the mixed integer programming model is more complicated
in η = 0.6 case due to the fact that a larger number of scenarios have probabilities
of occurrence that are influential. The computational time increases fast while the
graph size grows. For m = 7, it takes more than 5 minutes on average to get v∗. For
large graph input, we employ SAA and construction methods to find a good solution.
P2-SAA One popular approximation approach is to sample a certain number of
scenarios from the distribution, and solve the two-stage problem determined by this
approximate distribution. This is known as sample average approximation (SAA)
method. The basic idea is that a random sample is generated and the expected value
function is approximated by the corresponding sample average of the function over
the sample scenarios. Instead of considering all possible scenarios, we draw a fixed
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Table 17: Optimal Solutions for P2
m 3 4 5 6 7
η = 0.9
r(v∗, ṽ) 89.7% 91.1% 91.2% 91.3% 91.4%
t 0 0 1 8 49
η = 0.6
r(v∗, ṽ) 72.8% 74.8% 74.6% 75.2% 75.7%
t 0 0 2 31 331
number of samples from binomial distribution B(m, η) to mimic the choice made for
each user decision maker out of the two options. For example, when m = 3, η = 0.9,
we draw samples in which each user has probability 0.9 to choose the higher savings
choice and probability 0.1 to choose the lower savings one. Given m user decision
makers, we could use a vector of size |m| with binary numbers to present the choice
behavior of each user. We use 1 to stand for the scenario when the higher savings
option is chosen and 0 for the scenario when the lower savings option is chosen. The
vector (1, 0, 1) represents a sample realization for the case when the first and third
user decision makers choose higher savings option, and second decision maker chooses
lower savings option. We record all sampled scenarios in set S̃. Note that the set S̃
may contain some repeated patterns. For example, s̃ = {(0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} is
possible.
Given S̃, we can construct an optimization model with objective to maximize













xij = 2 ∀i ∈ I (40)








ij ≤ cijxij +M(1− xij) ∀j ∈ J, i ∈ Is−, s ∈ S̃ (43)∑
j∈J
ysij = 1 ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S̃ (44)
zsij ≤ ysij ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, s ∈ S̃ (45)∑
j∈J
zsij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S̃ (46)∑
i∈I
zsij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J, s ∈ S̃ (47)
x, y, z binary, M is a big number (48)
Compared with P2, the objective is sample average function instead of the ex-
pected value function. We denote the objective value as v̂s. Note that the constraints
are similar to those in model P2. The only difference is that S is replaced by S̃. The
set S is all the 2m scenarios while S̃ includes the random samples drawn as designed.
We run a certain number of replications and pick the one with best expectation. See
Algorithm 3 for a general outline of the procedure. P is the number of replications
to draw samples of size N . Among all the P replications, we pick the solution that
provides the best objective value of P2.
In our experiment, we test three sample sizes: N = 5, 15, and 25. The replication
number P is 20. Table 18 shows the computational results for m = 6 with probability
η = 0.9 and 0.6. r(v̂s, ṽ) represents the sample average objective value relative to max
weight matching objective upper bound averaged over 50 graph instances. t stands
for the elapsed time in seconds. Compared with the results presented in Table 17,
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Algorithm 3 P2-SAA Algorithm
for p = 1 to P do




Find x̂j, where f(x̂j) ≥ f(x̂i),∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., P}
SAA provides good solutions that are close to optimality in the case where m=6. A
larger sample size yields a better solution but takes longer to solve. Solutions in the
case η = 0.9 do not have much difference with different sample sizes inputs. While in
the case η = 0.6, a larger sample size produces a better solution. This is reasonable
since with η = 0.9 case, preferable scenarios have higher probability to appear and
although we draw few samples, the scenarios captured are more representative of the
real behavior of users. On the other hand, in the η = 0.6 case, all scenarios occur
with nearly equal probability. Thus, without enough sample sizes drawn, the real
users’ behavior is hard to imitate. The above reason also leads to greater complexity
of the integer program in the η = 0.6 case, and the elapsed time for the η = 0.9 case
is shorter compared with the η = 0.6 case.
Table 18: P2-SAA, m = 6
N 5 15 25
η = 0.9
r(v̂s, ṽ) 91.2 91.3 91.3
t 1 3 4
η = 0.6
r(v̂s, ṽ) 74.2 75.0 75.1
t 3 19 55
When m = 12 in the case η = 0.9 , on average it takes more than 6 minutes with
sample size 15 and more than 16 minutes with sample size 25. It takes a longer time
in the case η = 0.6. For the experiment with sample size 5, it takes more than 11
minutes on average. With large graph input, SAA method may not be an efficient
104
method. Thus, we derive some construction methods in the following section which
are more efficient.
Construction Methods In this section, we construct two options for each active
decision maker by several strategies. Since max weight matching solution provides an
upper bound for the system’s total savings and the arcs chosen in this solution would
have relatively good weights, it is reasonable to fix one of the two options as the choice
from solving the max weight matching problem. Denote set of arcs in max weight
matching solution by S1. To determine the second option, it is beneficial to add an
arc with smaller savings because we assume that people are more likely to choose
the option with higher savings. Note that there is no guarantee that such a choice
exists for each active decision maker. In this case, we need to define some backup
choices if there does not exist a smaller savings choice. S1 +ScLc and S1 +ScLf are
two methods designed to satisfy this goal. To generate a good expected value in the
objective function of P2, it is reasonable to have solutions that contribute greatly to
total system savings. Thus we have developed the S1 + S2 method.
Related terminology is defined as follows:
S1: the set of arcs in the max weight matching solution on original complete
bipartite graph G
S2: the set of arcs in the max weight perfect matching solution on graph G\S1.
Ssmall(i): the set of arcs with weights smaller than the weights of arcs in S1 for
active user i, i ∈ I.
Slarge(i): the set of arcs with weights greater or equal to the weights of arcs in S1
for active user i, i ∈ I.
ScLc: the neighbors of arcs in S1 chosen such that for each active user i, if Ssmall(i)
exists, choose the arc with largest weight in Ssmall(i); otherwise, choose the arc with
smallest weight in Slarge(i).
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ScLf : the neighbors of arcs in S1 chosen such that for each active user i, if
Ssmall(i) exists, choose the arc with largest weight in Ssmall(i); otherwise, choose the
arc with largest weight in Slarge(i).
Set of construction methods are:
S1 + S2: two options are the union of S1 and S2.
S1 + ScLc: two options are the union of S1 and ScLc.
S1 + ScLf : two options are the union of S1 and ScLf .
Solutions from construction methods are shown in Table 19 with m = 6. The
objective value in P1 given the solution provided by construction method is denoted
as v̂c. Construction method S1 + S2 performs better in η = 0.6 case but worse in
η = 0.9 case compared with methods S1 + ScLc and S1 + ScLf . Note that S1 + S2
method considers to have a good total savings while S1 + ScLc and S1 + ScLf
methods are designed to lead each active decision maker to choose the solutions from
S1. Under such designs, S1 +S2 method yield a good solution in η = 0.6 case where
the probability of appearance of each scenario is more evenly distributed. But those
methods do not provide a good solution for η = 0.9 case since the appearance of
scenarios displays an uneven pattern.
Table 19: Construction Methods, m = 6
S1 + S2 S1 + ScLc S1 + ScLf
η = 0.9
r(v̂c, ṽ) 80.3 91.0 91.0
η = 0.6
r(v̂c, ṽ) 74.5 71.9 71.9
In order to improve the solution quality, we employ 1− exchange local search
method based on solutions from the above construction methods. During local search,
we replace one of the two-option assignment by another arc associated with the same
active user each time. A best improvement rule is used and we stop until we reach
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the local optimal solution. Table 20 shows the 1− exchange local search method for
solutions in Table 19. After local search, the solutions are very close to the optimal
solution in various construction methods referring to the results in Table 17.
Table 20: 1 - exchange Local Search on Construction Methods, m = 6
S1 + S2 S1 + ScLc S1 + ScLf
η = 0.9
r(v̂c, ṽ) 90.5 91.3 91.3
η = 0.6
r(v̂c, ṽ) 75.0 74.8 74.8
Note that the above construction methods are polynomial solvable and we would
be able to find a feasible solution in a reasonable time. Considering the number of
participants in the dynamic ride-sharing problem, construction methods might be a
practical way to find a feasible and good choice menu in timely manner.
5.4 Summary and Future Research
In this chapter, we design a menu of matching choices provided to participants with
the objective to maximize total system benefits, which would be intentionally used
for dynamic ride-sharing problem. We perform the analysis on a complete m by m
bipartite graph with η choices designed for users represented by left hand side nodes.
Two scenario assumptions are considered. One is to assume that users always prefer
the choice with better savings and the other one is to assume that users are likely to
choose any of the choice provided. In order to maximize the system’s total benefits
after users’ behavior in choice making, we are trying to induce users to choose the
option that is close to a max weight matching solution which is an upper bound.
Under the first scenario assumption, a polynomial algorithm is derived. The other
scenario assumes that people are more likely to choose the option with higher sav-
ings but still possible to choose the other option. We formulate this scenario into
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a two stage stochastic optimization model and maximize the expected system’s to-
tal savings. Solving the model directly is a hard task and we employ the sample
average approximation method for an estimated solution. The complexity is simpli-
fied since an integer program with a much smaller size is solved. We could derive
a fast algorithm integrating brach-and-cut method during the SAA procedure since
our problem has objective function piecewise linear and convex in first stage variables
[67]. To avoid solving an integer programming, we derive a set of construction meth-
ods which are polynomial solvable. Local search heuristics can improve the solution
further more.
Our analysis on the complete bipartite graph could support further analysis on
the dynamic ride-sharing problem. In real time ride-sharing settings, we may no
longer have a complete bipartite graph. A menu with zero or two choices would
be provided. Instead of analyzing the whole graph, we could solve a subgraph with
enough feasible matches by the similar methods derived for the complete bipartite
graph. Our future research will focus on applying the mechanism design for multiple
choice to the dynamic ride-sharing system to construct a more user-friendly system.
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